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In this opening chapter we present the background and problem discussion that forms the 
foundation for our purpose and research questions. We also present the delimitations and a 
short thesis outline.  
 
Risk introduces uncertainty into a specific situation and more importantly, risk is everywhere. 
The term risk management refers to making an uncertain outcome less risky through 
controlling the actual outcome beforehand. From a corporate perspective the main objective 
with handling risk is to reduce various exposures towards risks and mitigate the volatility in 
the cash flow stream. The most common risks originate from macroeconomic factors, such as 
exchange rate risks, interest rate risks and commodity price risks. Sweden is a small country 
with a volatile currency, and at the same time highly dependent on the international market. 
Many of the Swedish firms are active on an international basis, facing multifaceted risks from 
numerous sources. A multinational company (MNC) benefits from diversified markets, but is 
at the same time more exposed than a firm active on the domestic market, indicating a need 
for handling the increased exposure towards risks. 
Managing financial price risk is not a new phenomenon, but there has been an increase in 
derivatives usage, especially among Swedish firms. Alkebäck (2006) found an increase in the 
use of derivatives from 52% in 1996 to 59% in 2003, whereas the use of currency derivatives 
is the most common form of handling exposures. Additionally, many firms today actually 
hedge the majority of their anticipated exposure denominated in foreign currency. In other 
words, highly exposed firms manage their exposure to an increasing extent, suggesting that 
the majority of their foreign sales are secured at the forward price. These arguments indicates 
that risk management has increased in importance, but also that a larger part of the 
companies‟ revenues are affected by the positions taken in derivatives. An individual firm 
may perceive risk management as necessary, but does hedging increase the shareholder value? 
 
The theory surrounding risk management is derived from the Miller and Modigliani (M&M) 
irrelevance propositions (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Their hypothesis suggests that the 
firm value is independent of risk management because the actions could be replicated by 
shareholders at a lower cost. This hypothesis holds when the following four assumptions are 
fulfilled: perfect capital markets, symmetric information, given investment strategies and 
equal access. But in the real world, frictions exist and these assumptions are violated, for 
example through information asymmetries or taxes. The main source to value creation in risk 
management theory is the reduction in volatility of cash flows. The theoretical framework 
supporting the subject emphasizes four main areas where risk management affects value: 
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mitigating the underinvestment problem, decreasing financial costs of distress, decreasing 
expected tax liabilities and through managerial risk aversion. 
Within the research field there are a vast number of empirical studies investigating 
determinants of hedging, trying to pinpoint the relationship between theory and practice. For 
example, Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) found that firm´s with growth opportunities 
hedge, supporting the theory about underinvestment. Graham and Rogers (2002) finds support 
for the hypothesis that firms use hedging to decrease the expected costs of financial distress 
and Graham and Smith (1999) strengthens the idea about reducing the expected tax liability. 
Although, the findings regarding determinants of risk management is contradictive and do not 
present a unified picture. Furthermore many of the studies do not present any evidence 
between the determinant of risk management and the actual value creation. 
The studies regarding value creation is more limited than the ones covering the determinants 
and also provides rather indistinct conclusions. The most common financial price risk can be 
divided into three categories, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk and commodity risk. The 
majority of the existing studies focus on either countries, industries or the type of hedging. 
Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007) provides evidence that corporate governance is a 
determinant of hedging premium, which suggests country specific attributes as an important 
source to value creation. Moreover, various industries have been examined, such as the gold 
industry by Jin and Jorion (2006) and the airline industry by Carter, Rogers and Simkins 
(2002). Jin and Jorion (2006) found no value creating effects, while Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins found a positive premium for fuel hedgers. When considering the type of hedging, 
different studies focuses on either exchange rate risk, interest rate risk or commodity risk, 
where positive hedging premiums have been found for all three types of hedging. 
As mentioned before, exchange rate risk is the most prominent risk and also the most 
managed. Allayannis and Weston (2001) were the first researches to actually examine the link 
between firm value, exposure and hedging trough currency derivatives. They investigate 720 
U.S. non-financial firms during 1990-1995 and find a positive premium associated with the 
use of derivatives. Furthermore they argue that risk management should be the most valuable 
when the home currency is appreciating and found supporting evidence, even if the 
estimations were conducted on a rather facile basis. A number of studies have followed their 
methodology to investigate various types of hedging activities in order to determine whether 
risk management is value adding or not. One important aspect to stress is about the 
universality of their results. The fact that significant differences exist between countries, for 
example between the American and Swedish market, challenges the transferability of their 
findings. 
The Swedish market is less investigated than the U.S market, but studies have been conducted 
regarding both determinants and value creation of risk management. Hagelin (2003) 
conducted a study based on a survey covering listed Swedish firms 1997 to map the 
determinants of hedging with currency derivatives on the Swedish market. The findings 
indicate that Swedish firm‟s hedge currency risk in order to mitigate the underinvestment 
problem and the indirect costs of financial distress. Moreover, Pramborg (2004) investigated 
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the hedging premium on the Swedish market based on a survey between the years 1997-2001 
and found a positive hedging premium for firms using currency derivatives. These years was 
characterized by a depreciation of the Swedish krona which in theory should undermine the 
value creation for hedgers using currency derivatives. The overall result suggests a positive 
premium for the total period, without being able to determine the yearly impact on the 
premium in an assuring way. Moreover, Pramborg (2004) only provides a short discussion on 
the sources of the value creation based on prior research. 
Our study aims at filling in some of the gaps in previous research and to contribute to the 
overall picture of the subject of risk management. Allayannis and Weston (2001) is the most 
extensive article examining the use of currency derivatives. But there are several important 
differences between the Swedish and the U.S. market. We would like to stress the importance 
of two dimensions. First, Sweden is more dependent on the international trade markets, which 
increases the overall exposure and therefore the need for risk management. Thence should 
motivate a higher premium. Second, Sweden has a more volatile currency which increases the 
possibility of mitigating deviations in cash flows and creating value through hedging. 
Furthermore, prior research tries to determine time bound differences by rather facile methods 
missing to account for important aspects. Therefore we study a period of both appreciation 
and deprecation, where we take the yearly differences into consideration to highlight potential 
disruptions. We hope to contribute through important and interesting distinctions between the 
years and enlighten risk management in regards to the contextual developments during the 
period. Many studies present either the determinants or the premium for the value creation 
while few studies try to link these two aspects together over a combined time period using the 
same sample. Therefore, we also aim towards increasing the knowledge about the sources of 
value creation in direct relation to the period we have chosen to study. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate to what extent currency derivatives is value creating 
for Swedish firms, and if so, we aim towards determining the source of the value creation. We 
have formulated two research questions to operationalize our purpose: 
1. Does the use of currency derivatives increase firm value for Swedish firms during 
2005-2008 and does the value differ between the years? 
2. Given that the use of currency derivatives is value creating, what is the source of value 
creation? 
 
The most prominent delimitation in this study is whether a firm hedges or speculates in their 
initiated currency hedging positions. The availability of this information is limited and 
especially when a study is based on databases and annual reports where the disclosure 
regarding this matter is very weak. Instead, we turn to previous research on the Swedish 
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market highlighting this aspect and rely on their findings (see, Alkebäck, Hagelin and 
Pramborg 2006). 
 
In Chapter two we present the literature review, introducing the reader to the theoretical and 
empirical framework we built this thesis on. We describe the motives for risk management, 
empirical research on value creation and specific studies covering the Swedish market. In 
Chapter three we present the methodological framework supporting this study, exploring and 
explaining the sample, statistical models and choice of variables. Lastly we provide a 
discussion on the statistical models, validity and reliability of this study. Chapter four 
discloses our findings through descriptive statistics and regression models. Chapter five 
provides the reader with an extensive analysis of the statistics, where we try presenting a 
multifaceted analysis based on both theoretical and empirical evidence. In the last Chapter we 
summarize the findings and present the most eminent conclusions. 
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This chapter will provide a comprehensive summary of previous studies on the subject of 
value creating risk management. Firstly, the theory behind value creating risk management 
will be investigated followed by a review of the results of empirical studies trying to determine 
whether or not these theories are applicable in reality. Secondly, a review of the results from 
empirical studies trying to find proof of value creation deriving from risk management. This 
chapter will be concluded by a review of the research done within this subject on the Swedish 
market specifically.  
 
All theory regarding value creation from doing risk management takes its beginnings in the 
Miller and Modigliani (M&M) irrelevance propositions (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). M&M 
makes four assumptions under which firm value is independent of risk management actions 
undertaken by management, since these actions could as easily be managed by the 
shareholders themselves. The four M&M assumptions are the following: 
 Perfect capital markets: Under this assumption there are no taxes, no transaction costs, 
no institutional frictions and no costs of bankruptcy or financial distress.  
 Symmetric information: All investors and firms have equal access to information and 
have identical perceptions about how this information will impact asset prices.  
 Given investment strategies: How firms decide to invest in real capital is taken as a 
given and is assumed to be independent of how firms choose to finance themselves.  
 Equal access: All players, firms and individuals, have exactly the same access to 
financial markets under the same terms (Culp, 2002). 
However, these four assumptions do not hold in reality and it is these violations of the M&M 
assumptions (capital market imperfections, unequal access of participants to the capital 
market and asymmetric information) that create the possibility for shareholder value creation 
through corporate risk management.  
Normally, risk management reduces the volatility of cash flows which in turn reduces the 
variance of firm value, and an important implication of this is that the probability of low firm 
values decreases. In other words, when a firm faces a shortfall in cash they can either reduce 
investment or increase outside financing, which means that variability in cash flows adds 
costly disturbances to financing and investment plans (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993).  
Furthermore, firm value is argued to be a concave objective function due to capital market 
imperfections (Bartram, 2000). This implicates that lower cash flow volatility reduces costs 
stemming from these capital market imperfections, which in turn generates higher cash flows 
to the owners, hence creating a higher expected firm value.  
 
 
10 
 
For companies with high financial leverage and volatile firm value, managers may be inclined 
to turn down positive net present value (NPV) projects, acting in the shareholders‟ interest, 
since the increase in value would be used to satisfy debt holders in the event of bankruptcy 
while being financed by equity (Myers, 1977). This underinvestment problem occurs in 
situations of low firm value. As mentioned above, one implication of risk management is the 
reduction of probability of low firm value situations, as a result agency costs are avoided 
which increases shareholder value. According to Bessembinder (1991:531) “by shifting 
individual future states from default to non-default outcomes, hedgers increase the proportion 
of future states in which equity holders are the residual claimants”. Since hedging increases 
the fraction of benefits accruing to shareholders derived from incremental investments, 
shareholders should be less prone to underinvest. The underinvestment problem is more 
pronounced in the presence of more investment opportunities and therefore should firms that 
derive large portions of their market value from growth options rather than assets in place be 
more inclined to hedge (Mian, 1996). 
Another source of value is that a firm that is currently not at risk of experiencing 
underinvestment problems can by engaging in risk management increases their leverage 
without increasing the risk of incurring underinvestment costs, and thereby benefit from 
additional tax shields (Bartram, 2000). Furthermore, high corporate leverage may induce 
managers to engage in high risk projects (asset substitution problem or risk shifting problem) 
since if they are successful the shareholders will enjoy most of the gains, whereas the 
creditors would bear most of the costs if unsuccessful (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  These 
acts can induce agency costs since creditors will demand higher interest rates and/or impose 
debt covenants. Risk management will reduce the riskiness of these projects and hence reduce 
or avoid the associated agency costs. (Bartram, 2000) In other words, hedging binds a firm‟s 
ability to meet its obligations and therefore signals commitment to its creditors, which can 
enable value-increasing contracting terms (Bessembinder, 1991). 
Using a sample of 372 Fortune 500 non-financial companies in 1990, Géczy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997) find that companies that have large growth opportunities but low access to 
financing are more likely to hedge currency exposure. This result is line with theory that firms 
hedge in order to reduce cash flow volatility which could otherwise lead to underinvestment. 
A questionnaire survey of 169 US firms (31,6% response rate) made by Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993) finds that firms using hedging derivatives have significantly larger R&D 
expenditures and that firms with more investment opportunities hedge more often and have 
lower leverage, pointing towards the avoidance of underinvestment as a determinant for 
hedging. However, Mian (1996), using data disclosed in the 1992 annual reports for 543 US 
firms, finds differing results. Using market-to-book-value ratio as a proxy for investment 
opportunities, Mian (1996) finds a negative relation between investment opportunities and 
hedging which contradicts the underinvestment hypothesis. 
Graham and Rogers (2002) finds inconclusive results depending on what measure they use as 
a proxy for investment opportunities. When using R&D expenses and book-market ratio they 
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reject the hypothesis that firm‟s hedge in response to underinvestment costs, but when using 
the product of the debt and market-book ratios their results are consistent with firms hedging 
to minimize underinvestment costs in the presence of growth options. Gay and Nam (1998) 
extends previous research by examining the underinvestment hypothesis as a hedging 
determinant more closely. They use various proxies for the firm‟s investment opportunity set 
and finds consistent evidence for the relation between a firm‟s investment opportunities and 
its use of hedging. They also find evidence suggesting that firms with large growth 
opportunities hedges more when their liquidity is low and that there is a negative correlation 
between derivatives use and the  internal generation of cash flows. Gay and Nam‟s findings 
strongly support the hypothesis that the willingness to avoid underinvestment problems drives 
firms‟ use of hedging instruments. Gay and Nam (1998:68) conclude by saying: “Our results 
show that firms can and do use derivatives as one strategy to maximize shareholder value”.  
 
The volatility of cash flows can induce situations where a firm‟s available liquidity is not 
enough to meet its obligations. These situations originates transaction costs of financial 
distress and the expectation of such costs is determined by the size of these costs multiplied 
by the probability of an illiquidity situation arising. (Myers, 1977) Risk management can 
increase firm value by reducing the cash flow volatility which decreases the probability of an 
illiquidity situation, thus lowering the expected costs of financial distress (Mayers and Smith, 
1982). For an illustration, see Appendix 1. The reduction of probability of financial distress 
has a second effect by increasing a firm‟s potential to carry debt, which creates further value 
increasing tax shields (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Also with regards to costs of financial distress as a determinant for corporate hedging are the 
empirical findings mixed. Graham and Rogers (2002) and Howton and Perfect (1998), find 
evidence consistent with firms using derivatives to avoid large expected costs of financial 
distress.  Mian (1996) does, however, not find any support for the hypothesis that hedging is 
undertaken to minimize expected costs of financial distress. Purnanandam (2008) examines 
costs of financial distress as a determinant for hedging by investigating more than 2,000 US 
firms for the fiscal year 1996-1997. Firstly, he finds that the incentives for hedging increases 
with the life of a project, since both the likelihood of financial distress, as well as the expected 
losses of default increases with the life of assets. He also finds that firms with high leverage 
hedge more, however, the incentives for hedging disappears for firms with very high leverage. 
Furthermore, firms that increase their leverage moderately also increase their hedging 
whereas firms that leverages up very much decrease their hedging. So, Purnanandam (2008) 
finds a U-shaped relation between the level of hedging and expected costs of financial 
distress. He also finds a positive relation between the concentration of a firm‟s industry and 
the level of hedging when financially distressed. 
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If a firm is subject to a convex tax scheme, a reduction in the volatility of pre-tax income 
through risk management can increase the expected after-tax firm value by reducing the 
expected tax liability, see Appendix 2 (Smith and Stultz, 1985). A convex tax scheme exists 
when the marginal tax rate increases progressively with the size of pre-tax income, but could 
also be indirectly induced by tax rules and regulations (Bartram, 2000).  
Graham and Smith (1999) analyzed more than 80,000 COMPUSTAT firm-year observations 
(US firms) and found that firms face a convex effective tax function in 50% of the cases and 
thus have tax-based incentives for hedging. Using a simulation method they find that for those 
firms facing a convex tax schedule, a 5% reduction in the volatility of pre-tax income 
generates, on average, tax savings of 5.4% of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases these 
savings reached 40%. However, the potential for tax savings is far from equally distributed 
among firms. Graham and Smith (1999) find that for 75% of all firms there is little tax-based 
incentives to hedge, but in the extreme cases the potential tax savings are substantial. They 
also stress the point that the savings potential derived from tax-based hedging is not mutually 
exclusive from other hedging incentives such as underinvestment and increased debt capacity.  
Graham and Rogers (2002) test if firm‟s respond to two tax-related incentives to hedging. 
They test the incentive to reduce income volatility by reducing expected tax liabilities and the 
incentive to increase tax-shields and debt capacity through volatility reduction. By examining 
442 US firms in 1994 and 1995, they find that, in general, large firms who faces large 
expected costs of financial distress, but are not actually in severe distress, hedge more. 
Graham and Rogers (2002) finds evidence supporting the theory that firms hedge to increase 
debt capacity and tax-shields, but they find no evidence supporting the theory that firms 
should hedge in order to reduce expected tax liability when they have a convex tax function. 
They believe that the incentives to hedge in response to tax function convexity is to small 
relative to other determinants. 
However, Nance Smith and Smithson‟s (1993) results does show evidence supporting that 
firms hedge to reduce expected tax liabilities, since firms hedge more if they have more 
convex tax schedules. The firms that hedge in their study have plenty more tax credits and a 
bigger part of their income in the progressive part of the tax schedule. These results are shared 
by Howton and Perfect (1998), who also finds that firms hedges to decrease expected tax 
liabilities. Contrary to these results, Mian (1996) finds no relation between the use of hedging 
instruments and convex tax schedules or tax loss carry forwards.  
 
Agency costs may also arise as a consequence of managers often having an undiversified 
wealth position associated with their employment in the firm. This means that managers have 
an incentive to secure the ongoing existence of the firm but also to reduce their personal 
undiversified exposure through corporate hedging, which may be at the expense of well 
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diversified investors. (Bartram, 2000) On the other hand, if managers are not allowed to 
hedge, their risk aversion may lead to underinvestment since managers may reject positive 
NPV projects which increase variability (Smith and Stulz, 1985). So, risk management 
derived from managerial risk aversion has a value creating dimension in it. Since managerial 
risk aversion is derived from their personal utility function, Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that 
the level of hedging will be dependent on how managers are compensated. Managers 
compensated with stock are more prone to hedging, whereas option compensation may even 
entice them to “reverse hedge”, which is why the devising of a managerial compensation plan 
is correlated to the firm‟s hedging policy (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Tufano‟s (1996) investigation of risk management in the North American gold mining 
industry does not find any relationship between derivatives use and the theories of value 
maximizing risk management. His findings are however in line with Smith and Stulz‟s (1985) 
theories; in that his evidence shows that the more options the management own, the less risk 
they manage and the more shares they own, the more risk they manage.  Both Graham and 
Rogers (2002) and Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) find a positive relation between the level 
of hedging and the value of managers‟ stock and option portfolios. Furthermore, Knopf, Nam 
and Thornton (2002) also find that as stock return volatility increase firms hedge less, 
something that Graham and Rogers (2002) tests for but finds no supportive evidence. On the 
other hand, neither Gay and Nam (1998) nor Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) find any 
evidence that supports the theory of Smith and Stulz (1985). 
Spanó (2007) gathered information on 443 UK non-financial firms over 1999 and 2000 from 
financial statements. He looks at the relationship between hedging and managerial ownership 
using a different hypothesis than previous research: “managerial risk aversion is an incentive 
to deviate from optimal hedging position” (Spanó, 2007:1245). Spanó (2007) finds that the 
actual decision to implement a hedging program is rather based on other factors, aimed at 
enhancing shareholders‟ wealth (i.e. underinvestment costs, financial distress costs and 
expected tax liabilities). However, his findings show evidence that managerial motivations are 
central to decide the firm‟s risk profile, which lead to suboptimal derivatives usage. Where 
managers‟ wealth is directly linked to firm value, the firm‟s hedging position often deviates 
from perfect balance, systematically generating gains and losses. Furthermore, Spanó (2007) 
provides empirical evidence showing that firm‟s who are exposed to takeover risk uses 
hedging derivatives in a manner designed to prevent a takeover rather than increasing firm 
value.  
 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) are the first to empirically investigate if there is a direct 
relation between hedging activities and firm value. Using Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for firm value, 
they investigate 720 non-financial US firms between 1990 and 1995. Their focus lies on the 
subsample that is constituted by firms having a foreign currency exposure through foreign 
sales, in order to investigate differences in firm values depending on whether they hedge this 
exposure or not.  Indicative univariate tests show higher mean values of Q being awarded to 
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those firms who hedge their foreign currency exposure. Thereafter, Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) conduct multivariate tests, in which other factors suggested by theory to influence the 
Q value are controlled for. For those firms that are exposed to foreign exchange rate risk, they 
find a positive relation between currency hedging and firm value which suggests that those 
firms who actively manages their exposure are awarded a premium of 3.6%-5.3% of firm 
value. Allayannis and Weston (2001) are also able to show that a value premium for currency 
hedging is being awarded during times of dollar appreciation as well as during times of dollar 
depreciation. The premium is however much larger during times of dollar appreciation. 
Furthermore, their findings reveal that when firms initiate hedging programs their firm value 
increases in relation to those firms who stay unhedged and when firms terminate their hedging 
programs they are penalized by a reduction in value in relation to those firms who remain 
hedged. This further strengthens their multivariate test findings of a value premium being 
awarded for hedging currency exposure. Allayannis and Weston (2001) concludes that, on 
average, for firms who are exposed to foreign exchange rate risk, investors awards those firms 
that hedges this risk with a 4.87% value premium.  
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2002) aims to complement the study done by Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) by not only showing that hedging adds value, but also trying to determine the 
source of this added value. They do this by examining the effects of jet fuel hedging 
(commodity price risk) on the value of US airlines. They choose the airline industry because 
their investment spending is positively correlated with the costs of jet fuel and the fact that 
airlines face significant costs of financial distress. This means that Carter, Rogers and Simkins 
have chosen their sample industry because it fits the theory that hedging adds value through 
the reduction of underinvestment. They follow the methodology in Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) and their results show that hedging jet fuel adds value to airlines, a premium of 12-
16%. Carter Rogers and Simkins are also able to show a positive correlation between changes 
in hedging policies and changes in firm value. Their results show that the added value from 
hedging increases when firms increase capital investment; they therefore mean that jet fuel 
hedging allows airlines to invest even in periods with high jet fuel prices, hence reduces 
underinvestment.  
Graham and Rogers (2002) tests two tax-related incentives to hedge and from there try to 
derive the associated increase in firm value. More specifically, they aim to test if a sample of 
442 US firms with assets greater $ 150 million respond to “the incentive to reduce volatility, 
thereby increasing debt capacity and the tax benefits of debt, and the incentive to reduce 
expected tax liabilities by reducing the volatility of taxable income” (Graham and Rogers, 
2002:815). Graham and Rogers (2002) find that hedging leads to larger debt capacity, on 
average by 3%. This translates to a capitalized value of the incremental tax shields of 1.1% of 
the firm‟s market value of assets.    
 
Traditional theories of risk management derive the usage of hedging instrument from various 
market imperfections or managerial incentives and are aimed towards reducing cash flow 
volatility. Nain (2005) says that in these theories, the determinants of why firms hedge is 
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studied in isolation from its industry. Nain argues that a firm‟s incentive to hedge is largely 
affected by the hedging decisions made by its competitors, using the following rationale. If an 
unhedged industry experiences a cost shock they will adjust their profit maximizing output, 
meaning that industry output prices will co-vary with costs. This means that in an industry 
where most firms hedge their input prices, output prices will not vary with cost shocks, 
meaning that an unhedged firm in this industry will face the cost shock without being able to 
offset the shock by adjusting output prices. On the other hand, in a largely unhedged industry 
a hedging firm will face certain input costs but uncertain output prices since their competitors 
will adjust prices according to costs. Thus, “unhedged firms in a largely hedged industry have 
more volatile profits than hedged firms” and “in largely unhedged industries, hedged firms 
have more volatile profits than unhedged firms” (Nain, 2005:2). Nain therefore argues that the 
hedging decision made by a firm‟s competitors should be an important determinant for the 
firm‟s own hedging decision. Nain‟s results show that in non-hedging industries, a 10% 
depreciation of the dollar, increasing the costs of imported inputs, is passed through to output 
prices which rise by 1,8%. However, if half of the industry hedges, the output prices only 
increase by 0.9%. Based on these results, Nain finds that the foreign exchange rate exposure, 
and therefore volatility, increase for unhedged firms and decreases for hedged firms as the 
general industry level of hedging increases. Nain (2005) concludes by investigating the 
hedging premium on firm value conditional on the level of hedging in the industry. In contrast 
to earlier empirical research on the effects of currency hedging on firm value, Nain finds no 
value effects for neither hedged nor unhedged firms in largely unhedged industries. However, 
in industries where hedging is widespread Nain finds that unhedged firms are valued lower 
than hedged firms, measured by Tobin‟s Q. Nain (2005) argues that unhedged firms in hedged 
industries suffer value discounts and that the propensity to hedge foreign exchange rate risk is 
greater if many competitors are hedging. 
The paper written by Kim, Mathur and Nam (2006) examines the relation between operational 
and financial hedging and their effect on firm value. They mean that an operational hedging 
strategy will decrease the volatility of cash flows in much the same way as financial hedging 
and should therefore increase firm value. They use a sample of 424 US firms during 1996-
2000 and find evidence that those firms that are not operationally hedged use more financial 
hedging and that firms with foreign activity use less financial hedging than exporting firms. 
Kim, Mathur and Nam (2006) further find a positive relation between operational and 
financial hedging meaning that the different hedging strategies are complementary. Finally, 
their regressions show positive firm value effects for both financial and operational hedging. 
Specifically, they find a financial hedging premium of 5.4% and that operational hedging 
increase firm value by 4.8-17.9%. 
In Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007), a broad sample of firms from 39 countries between 1990 
and 1999 are examined as to whether hedging add value in this more international context and 
more specifically if differences in corporate governance structures has an effect. Initially, they 
present evidence suggesting a value premium being awarded to firms engaging in risk 
management around the world. They find this premium to range between 9% and 20% for 
firms that are exposed to exchange rate risk. This is substantially higher than the 4.8% 
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premium awarded to US firms in the findings of Allayannis and Weston (2001) and is 
explained by the authors to be plausible since non-US firms face much higher exposure 
caused by significantly higher exchange-rate volatility in non US currencies. Next, 
Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007) find that firms with strong internal corporate governance 
are awarded higher premiums for their hedging, whereas firms with weak internal corporate 
governance are not awarded any hedging premium but are not value-destroying either. In 
terms of the external corporate governance system, Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007) find 
evidence suggesting that firms residing in countries with strong shareholder rights, strong 
creditor rights, or Anglo-Saxon legal origins are creating more value from hedging than firms 
residing in countries with weak external corporate governance. Lastly, they find that the 
impacts of weak external corporate governance cannot be compensated for by good internal 
governance, but the impacts of weak internal governance can be mitigated by having a strong 
external corporate governance system. These findings therefore leads Allayannis, Lel and 
Miller (2007) to draw the conclusion that a strong legal environment and country-level 
governance hinders managers to conduct risk management activities that would only benefit 
themselves. Furthermore, the results suggest that both firm-level and country-level corporate 
governance play a significant role in understanding when risk management is associated with 
higher value. 
 
In 1996, Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) sent out a questionnaire to all non-financial firms on 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange, of which 76.6% (163 firms) responded, with the ambition to 
investigate the derivatives use in Sweden. The survey was then compared to similar studies 
conducted on the US and the New Zealand market. The first findings concluded that more 
firms hedge in the smaller economies of Sweden (52%) and New Zealand (53%) than in the 
USA (39%). Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) find that these smaller open economies which 
import and export more than the USA suffer from a higher macroeconomic exposure with 
higher volatilities in both exchange rates and interest rates, providing larger incentives for 
hedging. In all three countries it was found that larger firms hedge more than medium and 
small ones. This relationship was, however, more pronounced in Sweden than in the USA and 
could, according to the authors indicate that it is more costly to initiate a hedging program in 
Sweden than in the USA. In Sweden, the biggest concern of the financial directors was that 
the firm lacked knowledge about derivatives, and this concern was most widespread among 
the smaller firms. Since this issue was of small concern to the American financial directors, 
coupled with the more prevalent relationship between hedging and firm size in Sweden, 
Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) agues these are consequences of Sweden having a less mature 
derivatives market. It was further found by Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) that Swedish firms 
mainly use derivatives for hedging purposes and in those cases where speculation or arbitrage 
activity was ventured into, it was mostly conducted by large firms. Another interesting finding 
by Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) is that among the responding Swedish firms, it was almost 
equally common to hedge translation exposure as it was hedging transaction exposure.  
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Hagelin (2003) sets out to investigate the determinants of hedging decisions on the Swedish 
market as well as to analyze what type of foreign exchange exposure that firm‟s hedge. He 
investigates the behavior of 101 (63% survey response rate) Swedish non-financial listed 
firms in 1997. The first pattern that Hagelin (2003) notices is that larger firms hedge more 
using currency derivatives, which suggests a presence of fixed costs associated with hedging 
excluding small firms from the market. Hagelin‟s (2003) main findings show that Swedish 
firms using currency derivatives to hedge transaction exposure do so in order to mitigate 
indirect costs of financial distress and to diminish the underinvestment problem. He further 
notes that there is no relation between the alleviation of these problems and hedging of 
translation exposure. So, the results of Hagelin‟s survey is that Swedish firms use currency 
derivatives to hedge transaction exposure in order to improve firm value whereas this reason 
is not the answer as to why firms hedge translation exposure.  
In 2003, Alkebäck, Hagelin and Pramborg (2006) conducted a very similar survey as the one 
conducted by Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999) for 1996. The purpose is to investigate how the 
use of derivatives in Swedish firms has developed over the seven years that separates the two 
surveys. They achieved a 51.3% response rate by receiving answers from 134 non-financial 
firms, all listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The share of firms using derivatives 
increased from 52% in 1996 to 59% in 2003. Increased use of hedging instruments by small 
and medium sized firms accounted for the biggest part of the total increase. In 2003, foreign 
exchange rate hedging is the most prevalent use of derivatives before hedging of interest rate 
exposure, as was the case in 1996. The findings also show that almost all hedging firms use 
currency derivatives, whereas interest rate hedging is limited to large firms. Alkebäck, 
Hagelin and Pramborg (2006) find that in 2003, 53% of the hedging firms hedges translation 
exposure, which is less than in 1996 but more frequent than in other countries. They see this 
as evidence that the Swedish firms‟ derivatives use may be conforming to how firms in other 
countries use derivatives. Furthermore, lack of knowledge about derivatives is no longer the 
issue of greatest concern in 2003 for financial directors; instead they now mostly worry about 
accounting treatment, transaction costs and liquidity. Alkebäck, Hagelin and Pramborg (2006) 
interpret this as a sign of generally increased knowledge about derivatives amongst Swedish 
firms.  
Hagelin et al. (2007) further uses three questionnaire surveys concerning the years 1998-1999 
and 2000-2001, sent to Swedish non-financial firms with an average response rate of 53%, in 
order to examine the impact on firm value from hedging decisions based on management 
stock option plans. Initially, Hagelin et al (2007) finds a positive relationship between 
derivatives use and the price sensitivity of managerial stock options and also weak evidence 
saying that as the sensitivity of managerial stock options to stock return volatility increase, 
firms hedge less. These findings are in line with the findings of Knopf, Nam and Thornton 
(2002) and the predicting theories of Smith and Stulz (1985).  
Moreover, the results of Hagelin et al. (2007) shows that hedgers have higher valuations than 
non-hedgers but are careful to draw the conclusion that it is hedging that causes an increase in 
firm value. However they do find that managers who pursue hedging based on the price 
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sensitivity of managerial stock options significantly decrease firm value. Finally, Hagelin et al 
(2007) looks at other determinants of hedging in Sweden and finds no support for the costs of 
financial distress hypothesis, nor is evidence found supporting that Swedish firms are hedging 
to increase debt capacity end thence interest tax-shields. Their conclusion is therefore that the 
general relationship between firm value and hedging is yet to be proved, but that hedging on 
the basis on management self-interest is clearly value reducing. 
The paper written by Pramborg (2004) aims to investigate the effects on firm value from 
geographical diversification, net exposure and hedging activity. Pramborg‟s paper further 
wants to add to the findings of Allayannis and Weston (2001) by examining whether there is a 
difference in value effects between transaction exposure and translation exposure. The sample 
used in this study comes from three different questionnaires, the first used by Hagelin (2003), 
the second used by Hagelin and Pramborg (2002), the third sent by Pramborg in 2001, and 
contains Swedish non-financial firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange for the period 
1997 – 2001. The response rate was 63%, 47% and 49% respectively and sums up to 455 firm 
year observations. Pramborg‟s results show a premium being awarded to firms that are 
diversified geographically and hedges. He fails however to separate between geographical 
diversification and hedging as being the source of value creation. His investigation further 
shows that transaction exposure hedging adds value, whereas translation exposure hedging 
may generate a value discount. Pramborg‟s last results show that firms with long positions in 
foreign currency have higher value, something which may however be explained by a 
depreciation of the Swedish krona during the sample period. 
 
In Table 2.1 we present a summary of the findings on determinants of hedging, grouped on 
the basis of the underlying theory. In Table 2.2, a summary covering the studies concerning 
value creating risk management is presented. 
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Table 2.1: Determinants of risk management 
 
Authors Time period Region of Study Methodology Sample size Relation to theory 
Underinvestment 
Géczy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997) 
1990 USA Multivariate 
regression 
372 Positive 
Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993) 
1986 USA Questionnaire 
survey 
169 Positive 
Mian (1996) 1992 USA Multivariate 
regression 
543 Negative 
Graham and 
Rogers (2002) 
1994-1995 USA Multivariate 
regression 
442 Inconclusive 
Gay and Nam 
(1998) 
1995 USA Multivariate 
regression 
325 Positive 
Hagelin (2003) 1997 Sweden Questionnaire 
survey/Regression 
101 Positive 
Costs of Financial Distress 
Graham and 
Rogers (2002) 
1994-1995 USA Multivariate 
regression 
442 Positive 
Howton and 
Perfect (1998) 
1994 USA Multivariate 
regression 
469 Positive 
Mian (1996) 1992 USA Multivariate 
regression 
543 None 
Purnanandam 
(2008) 
1996-1997 USA Simulation >2,000 U-shaped 
Hagelin (2003) 1997 Sweden Questionnaire 
survey/Regression 
101 Positive 
Hagelin et al. 
(2007) 
1998-2001 Sweden Questionnaire 
survey/Regression 
308 observations Negative 
Tax Incentive 
Graham and Smith 
(1999) 
1980-1994 USA Simulation >80,000 firm-
years 
Positive 
Graham and 
Rogers (2002) 
1994-1995 USA Multivariate 
regression 
442 Negative 
Nance Smith and 
Smithson (1993) 
1986 USA Questionnaire 
survey 
169 Positive 
Howton and 
Perfect (1998) 
1994 USA Multivariate 
regression 
469 Positive 
Mian (1996) 1992 USA Multivariate 
regression 
543 Negative 
Managerial wealth and risk aversion 
Tufano (1996) 1990-1993 North America Multivariate 
regression 
45 Positive 
Graham and 
Rogers (2002) 
1994-1995 USA Multivariate 
regression 
442 Positive 
Knopf, Nam and 
Thornton (2002) 
1996 USA Multivariate 
regression 
260 Positive 
Gay and Nam 
(1998) 
1995 USA Multivariate 
regression 
325 Negative 
Géczy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997) 
1990 USA Multivariate 
regression 
372 Negative 
Spanó (2007) 1999-2000 UK Multivariate 
regression 
443 Positive 
Hagelin et al. 
(2007) 
1998-2001 Sweden Questionnaire 
survey/Regression 
308 observations Positive 
20 
 
Table 2.2: Value creation from risk management 
Authors Period Region Methodology Sample size Exposure Value premium 
Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) 
1990-
1995 
USA Multivariate 
regression 
720 Exchange rate 4.87% 
Carter, Rogers and 
Simkins (2002) 
1994-
2000 
USA Multivariate 
regression 
27 Commodity price 12-16% 
Graham and Rogers 
(2002) 
1994-
1995 
USA Multivariate 
regression 
442 Exchange rate and 
interest rate 
1.1% of assets 
Nain (2005) 1997-
1999 
USA Multivariate 
regression 
3,080 
observations 
Exchange rate Conditional on 
industry 
Kim, Mathur and 
Nam (2006) 
1996-
2000 
USA Multivariate 
regression 
424 Exchange rate 5.4% financial 4.8-
17.9% operational 
Allayannis, Lel and 
Miller (2007) 
1990-
1999 
39 
countries 
Multivariate 
regression 
378 Exchange rate 9-20% 
Pramborg (2004) 1997-
2001 
Sweden Questionnaire 
survey 
455 
observations 
Exchange rate 13.8% 
  
The theories supporting risk management are solid frameworks that have provided a 
foundation for prior studies. Researchers have conducted a large number of empirical studies, 
but inconsistencies in findings still exist which to some extent may question the validity and 
reliability of prior studies. 
 
Regarding the determinants risk management the overall results points in the same direction 
and supports underinvestment, cost of financial distress, tax incentives and managerial wealth 
and risk aversion, as determinants of risk management (see Table 2.1). Even if the majority of 
the results are unified, some studies still fail to support the theories with empirical findings. 
The natural question arising from our perspective is why some studies manage to strengthen 
the theories, while other fails. As the majority of the studies still strengthen the theories, the 
most likely explanations lies in dissimilarities regarding the empirical methodology and proxy 
variables used in the empirical research. For an example, the studies covering tax incentives 
have differentiated methods of approaching the issue. Graham and Smith (1999) classify 
companies based on convexity in the tax functions and use a simulation to determine the 
potential effects, which supports the theory on tax incentives as a determinant of value 
creation. Conversely, Graham and Rogers (2002) find no evidence that firm‟s hedge to reduce 
the expected tax liability by using a random sample of 442 firms where the tax convexity is 
tested explicitly through multiple regressions. The comparison between the two studies 
illustrates that differences exists in sample selection and methodology, which would influence 
the results and bias the findings. 
Additionally, studies use different proxy variables which may be a source of divergence and 
bias the results. Empirical studies covering underinvestment as a determinant of risk 
management further strengthen the inconsistencies in findings, which may be affected by the 
choice of variables. For an example, Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) measure investment 
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opportunities through market-to-book, whereas Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) measure it 
through R&D expenditures and come to the same conclusion. Conversely, Graham and 
Rogers (2002) findings show opposing results for two different proxy variables, both 
measuring investment opportunities. Different proxy variables may generate the same results 
which indicate that different variables may converge, but could also be the source of 
inconsistencies. In fact, the use of proxy variables is not a precise science, but rather rough 
approximations to capture a phenomenon in practice. 
 
The theories predict that risk management is value enhancing and the prior research confirms 
that firms hedging exchange rate risk creates value (see Table 2.2). The overall findings from 
the studies presented in the literature review suggest a premium ranging from 1.1% to 20%, 
which is a large dispersion considering that all studies covers equivalent risk management 
activities. The methodological approaches are very similar in the majority of the studies, 
suggesting that the differences are attributed to other sources, e.g. sample, time period and 
contextual setting.  
The most prominent weakness is the wide dispersion of the premium size, which questions the 
universality of the results and the underlying factors contributing to the premium. Most 
studies have been conducted in the US and are dependent on the contextual prerequisites. 
Studies covering other countries, such as Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007) and Pramborg 
(2004), find significantly higher premium. This enlightens the importance of distinguishing 
between contextual settings in order to increase the predictability of when risk management is 
value enhancing. 
Moreover, prior studies measure the value creation from risk management over a combined 
time period, which we consider as a limitation because of two reasons. First, time bound 
differences in value creation may exist and previous research focus on determining the 
influence from only appreciation and depreciation by rather simplistic methods (see 
Allayannis and Weston (2001)). We argue that other influential sources may exist and that the 
time bound differences has to be taken into account through more sophisticated models in 
order to increase the accuracy and determining the influence from risk management. 
Secondly, through bundling years with different characteristics and exchange rate movements, 
the findings fail to show whether it is actually the decreased volatility that is value creating, or 
if other factors influence. We argue that, in order to in a convenient manner prove that risk 
management is value creating in the long-term, there is a need for filtering out distortions 
from other factors through a more refined approach. 
Few prior studies have tried to establish the link between value creation and the actual source. 
Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2002) find a premium from hedging commodity price risk in the 
airline industry which is derived from mitigation of the underinvestment problem. Besides 
their findings, previous research focuses on either the determinants or the actual value 
creation. We argue that there might be potential differences between the determinants and the 
actual source of value creation. 
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The method provides a detailed description of the methodology used to conduct the study. We 
describe the research approach, data collection, processing of data, regression models and 
the variables used. Furthermore we provide an analysis of our regression model and 
critically evaluate the validity and reliability of the study.  
 
Researchers have examined both determinants of risk management and value creation, but 
inconsistencies still exist. Allayannis and Weston (2001) performed their study in a different 
context; while Pramborg (2004) based their findings on survey results. Neither of these 
studies comprehensively elaborates on the difference between years or the sources of value. 
Thus, suggesting further elaboration on the subject is necessary to reach consistency whether 
risk management is rewarded with a value premium or not. The methodological process 
behind this study rests on a rigorous literature review, regarding both theoretical and 
empirical work. The research approach can be described as a deductive approach where the 
hypothesis is derived from theoretical considerations and the empirical data collected in 
accordance with the formulated hypothesis (Bryman, 2003). By deducting the hypothesis 
from theory we aim for contribute to the empirical work on risk management theories and 
provide insightful evidence regarding value creation and risk management in Sweden. 
The primary research question, derived from theory, is whether risk management creates 
value when hedging with currency derivatives and if differences exist over time. It is 
important to stress early on that even if currency derivatives are the most commonly used 
derivative, the use of other risk management activities may contribute to the hedging 
premium. Other studies have concluded that the premium found from investigating the use of 
currency derivatives could therefore be regarded as a proxy for the overall risk management, 
see Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007). The secondary 
research question relates to the sources of why risk management enhances firm value, where 
our intention is to identify the main sources of value creation, which may differ from the 
reasons/determinants of why a firms use currency derivatives that has been thoroughly 
examined by other researchers. 
 
In order to examine the potential value creation from the usage of currency derivatives and the 
source of the value, an extensive set of data is required. Previous studies examining 
determinants of risk management and value creation and have relied on secondary data from 
databases/annual reports (e.g. COMPUSTAT), primary data from surveys or a combined 
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approach.
1
 The main problem posed by previous researchers regarding data collection, is that 
annual reports and databases do not disclose whether the companies are hedging or 
speculating. A survey could reveal whether a firm hedges or speculates and enhance the 
accuracy of the data. On the other hand, surveys have several deficiencies. The most 
important aspect is respondents falling off and introducing skewness in the sample (Bryman, 
2003). Alkebäck, Hagelin and Pramborg (2006) achieved a response rate of 51.3% on the 
Swedish market which according to Bryman (2003) is weak. Pramborg (2004) also 
experienced a rather moderate response rate. In regards to the large fall offs in previous 
studies and the risk for systematic errors or skewness in the sample, a survey could undermine 
the reliability of the results. Our method of collecting data is based on secondary sources. We 
use DataStream and annual reports to collect key variables, enabling us to include the entire 
population.
2
 Regarding the issue if firm´s use derivatives to speculate or hedge, we rely on 
previous research, which suggests that firms are hedging with derivatives and not speculating 
(Alkebäck, Hagelin and Pramborg, 2006) and (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001).  
 
The sample in this study consists of the firms listed on the Large Cap and Mid Cap lists of the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange. The total amount of listed stocks is 161 when including all 
companies. However, Swedish companies are allowed to use multiple share classes, and in 
order to filter out the duplicates, we eliminate the A-class shares which are traded on 
somewhat different terms. This reduces our sample to 134 unique firms. Furthermore our 
sample requires that disclosure standards are fulfilled and consistency within the chosen time 
period, which constraints the available period to study. Disclosure requirements, accounting 
techniques and valuation of derivatives changed with the introduction of IFRS/IAS in January 
2005. The standard, IAS 39, changed the fundamentals of disclosure from nominal values to 
fair values of derivatives. Furthermore the new standards require the company to account for 
the fair values on the balance sheet and the net change in value has to be accounted for in the 
income statement. The implications regarding disclosure, capital structure and earnings, 
motivates our choice of studying 2005-2008. It constitutes a natural cut-off point in time. 
 
Except from selecting our sample based on listing and time related aspects, several other 
factors have to be taken into consideration. First off, we are interested in non-financial firms. 
Financial firms and banks are market makers and have dissimilar objectives with their usage 
of derivatives compared to non-financial firms (Allayannis and Weston, 2001). When 
excluding banks and financial services, our sample shrinks to 118 firms. Other researchers 
that conducted studies with the same approach excluded small firms based on the assumption 
                                                 
1
 Older studies mostly used surveys due to the weak disclosure of appropriate information. Examples of studies 
using surveys: Nance et al. (1993), Alkebäck and Hagelin (1999), Haushalter (2000) and Alkebäck et al. (2006). 
Example of a study using secondary sources: Allayannis and Weston (2001). Example of a combined approach: 
Hagelin (2003). 
2
 DataStream is a database from Thompson that provides company specific data. 
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that the fixed costs of initiating a risk management outweighs the benefits for small firms 
(Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997). Allayannis and Weston (2001) excluded firms with total 
assets below $500m, which represents approximately a firm value of SEK 4,000m. However, 
based on previous findings on the Swedish market we lower the requirement regarding market 
value. The usage of derivatives in Sweden has increased among small and medium sized 
firms, Alkebäck, Hagelin and Pramborg (2006) conclude that 89% of the large firms 
(>$250m), 68% of the medium sized companies ($50m-$250m) and 34% of the small firms 
(<$50m) use currency derivatives. Their research provides the empirical foundation for our 
sample selection and motivates that our sample is applicable. The lowest market value on mid 
cap should correspond to the medium sized firms, suggesting that all of the firms in our 
sample should be able to deploy a risk management program, without any constraints. If 
investors are recognizing this aspect, an exposed firm of sufficient size could be traded at a 
discount for not having risk management activities. Moreover, we excluded 10 firms based on 
missing information. The excluded companies have been examined individually and we do 
not recognize any patterns that might distort the sample, see Appendix 3 for a complete list. 
The sample ends up with 108 unique firms and 402 firm-years (unique observations), a total 
of 15% drop off. 
 
Building a regression model is a complex task. The dependent variables in the model must 
correspond to the underlying theoretical framework, but at the same time meet the statistical 
requirements (Brooks, 2008). With regards to measuring value creation, the regression models 
used by Allayannis and Weston (2001) provide the foundation, even if the variables in the 
model have been slightly modified to better suit our study. Regarding the source of value 
creation, we develop our own framework through elaborations on the main model.  
The data used in our investigation has the characteristics of panel data, the data consists of 
both time-series and cross-sectional observations (Damodar, 2004). The use of panel data has 
several distinct features which may be favorable. First, it takes the heterogeneity of the 
observations into account and introduces techniques to control potential differences over time 
and space. Second, it enhances the efficiency of extracting information from the data by 
allowing for variability, decreasing multicollinearity among the explanatory variables and 
increasing the degrees of freedom (Brooks, 2008). Although the benefits are appealing, panel 
data also has drawbacks. Baltagi (2005) argues that short time-series is a limitation because 
the results would heavily rely on the proportion of companies tending to infinity, thus 
reducing the predictability into infinity. By using panel data we increase the explanatory 
power, but at the same time many of the time-series are incomplete (missing yearly 
observations) which may bias the results. 
Moreover, Brooks (2008) argues that the easiest way to perform an analysis of panel data is 
by pooling the data and run pooled regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS). Although, 
pooling data does not take the autocorrelation into account. In financial econometrics this is a 
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common problem which has to be considered; otherwise the inferences may be invalid and 
not pass the prerequisites for using OLS (Brooks, 2008).  
The main research question is whether risk management is value creating or not and trying to 
pinpoint differences between the years. Hence, we need an approach that accounts for the 
problems with missing values in the time-series, industry effects, time effects and 
autocorrelation. We use a two folded approach by conducting both yearly cross-sectional 
regressions and panel data fixed effects regressions. The first set of regressions enlightens 
dissimilarities between the years, while the second approach accounts for the heterogeneity of 
the specific firms in the sample. The panel data regression also provides a robustness check to 
the overall results.  
Regarding the source of value creation, we use four different regressions with fixed effects, 
where the dependent variables correspond with the theoretical assumptions on value creation 
and risk management (underinvestment, financial distress, debt capacity and managerial risk 
aversion). 
 
An important aspect of this study is the variables we have chosen to examine if currency 
hedging is value enhancing. When analyzing complex economical problems, the goal is to 
obtain a high degree of determination in the models and significant results which corresponds 
to the theory supporting the hypothesis. The variables included in our model correlates well 
with similar previous studies, see Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Jin and Jorion (2006). 
 
In the regression models concerning value creation, we use Tobin´s Q as the dependent 
variable. In order to analyze the theoretical framework of why risk management is value 
creating, we use four different dependent variables: R&D and capital expenditures (CAPEX) 
divided by sales (underinvestment), net income divided by total assets (financial distress), 
debt-to-equity (debt capacity) and CEO ownership (managerial risk aversion). 
 
In order to examine the value creation of using currency derivatives we use Tobin´s Q as an 
estimation of firm value, which is the dependent variable in the regressions. Tobin´s Q was 
introduced by Tobin (1969) with the intention to capture a firm´s tendency to invest (Dadalt et 
al, 2003). Tobin´s Q is a very functional measure and has been used in various purposes, such 
as multinationality (Morck and Yeung, 1991), diversification effects (Lang and Stulz, 1994), 
examining board sizes (Yermack, 1996) and hedging premiums (Allayannis and Weston, 
2001).Tobin´s Q is defined as the market value of the firm in relation to the replacement cost 
of assets (Perfect and Wiles, 1994), see Equation 1.  
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Tobin´s Q = 
Market  Value  of  Assets
Replacement  Value  of  Assets
 (1) 
There are several approaches developed to calculate Tobin´s Q, either by using a simple 
algorithm as Chung and Pruitt (1994) or a more comprehensive approach as Perfect and Wiles 
(1994). We use the simple algorithm for measuring Q developed by Chung and Pruitt (1994). 
This method has several advantages: relatively low computational cost, data availability and a 
high correlation with other more comprehensive approaches (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). 
Furthermore, Dadalt, Donaldson and Garner (2003) conclude that unless extreme precision is 
required, the simple approach is more favorable. Chung and Pruitt (1994) formula is described 
in Equation 2. 
Tobin´s Q = 
MV  Equity +Preferred  Stock +BV  Debt  +Current  liabilities −Current  ass ets
BV  Total  Assets
 (2) 
An important issue to stress is the interpretation of the Q. Tobin (1969) suggests that a firm 
with a Q higher than 1 benefits from investing in new assets and will receive higher market 
valuation, while firms with a Q lower than 1 disfavors from investing. A firm with a Q lower 
than 1 implicitly suggests a low market value and a Q greater than 1 indicates that a firm has 
profitable growth opportunities. The market value of equity is the main determinant in the 
numerator, which highlights the importance of pinpointing factors influencing the market 
value of a company in the regression model. Furthermore, we use the natural logarithm of the 
Q to adjust the skewness and increase the linearity. Allayannis and Weston (2001) argue that 
the natural logarithm of Q translates the slope coefficients in the regression model to 
comparable figures, where the coefficient of hedging corresponds with the effect on Q 
described as a percentage of Q. 
 
The potential sources of value creation from risk management are tested through four separate 
regressions. Regarding underinvestment, we use the natural logarithm of the sum of R&D 
expenditures and CAPEX divided by total sales, see Equation 3 (for further motivation of this 
ratio see „3.4.3 Control variables‟). 
Underinvestment = ln 
R&𝐷+𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
Total  sales
  (3) 
Regarding the measurement of financial distress, there are a vast number of models available. 
Shumway (2001) compares different credit scoring models, for example the Altman z-score 
model and the hazard model. One interesting finding in his study is that net income divided by 
total assets (NI/TA) is a fairly decent estimator of bankruptcy risk. The ratio classifies 56.7% 
of the firms going bankrupted in the highest probability decile, while the Altman z-score only 
classifies 42.3%. Based on Shumway´s findings, we measure the risk of financial distress 
through NI/TA as the dependent variable, see Equation 4. 
Risk of financial distress = 
Net  income
Total  assets
 (4) 
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Adding value through reduction of expected tax liability is not possible in Sweden (no 
progressive tax scheme). On the contrary, risk management may increase the debt capacity 
and affect the firm value positively through additional tax-shields. We use the D/E ratio as the 
dependent variable to examine if companies that are hedging are utilizing this feature, see 
Equation 5. 
Debt capacity = 
Book  value  of  debt
Book  value  of  equity
 (5) 
The last value creating aspect, or value destroying, is managerial risk aversion. The dependent 
variable used to capture the impact of managerial risk aversion is the natural logarithm of 
CEO ownership (number of shares times share price) divided by the market value of the 
company, see Equation 6. With regards to the difficulties examining options, we refer to the 
findings of Hagelin et al. (2007) and will not examine this aspect. 
Managerial risk aversion = 
Number  of  shares  owned  by  CEO ∙Share  price
Market  value  of  equity
 (6) 
 
In order to create an understanding and motivation for how and why we define the variables 
related to risk management and value creation, we thoroughly described the regressors 
intended to capture these effects. To determine the exchange rate exposure of a company we 
use foreign sales to total sales, see Equation 7. 
Exchange rate exposure = 
Foreign  sales
Total  sales
 (7) 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) suggest that this ratio has a positive relation to a firm‟s exchange 
rate exposure, which is supported by Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997). To capture the 
hedging activity by a company, most researchers use a foreign currency derivatives dummy, 
only classifying hedgers and non-hedgers.
3
 Allayannis and Weston (2001) actually record the 
notional principals of the derivatives, in order to measure hedging activity by dividing 
notional value with foreign sales. However, this approach overstates the actual hedging ratio 
(Guay and Kothari, 2003). Furthermore, Swedish firms complying with IAS 39 only report 
the fair value which is considered to be a weak measurement of the level of hedging. To 
approximate the actual level of risk management we use a foreign currency derivative (FCD) 
dummy that equals one if the firm hedge with currency forwards, options, swaps or futures to 
manage currency risk and zero otherwise. This allows us to distinguish hedgers from non-
hedgers with and without foreign exchange rate exposure. All the information needed to 
examine the hedging activity has been collected by reviewing annual reports, along with 
additional facts.
4
 The FCD dummy is also the main variable in the regressions aiming at 
                                                 
3
 See, Allayannis and Weston (2001), Pramborg (2004) and Allayannis and Miller (2004). 
4
 Data from annual reports: currency derivatives, interest rate derivatives, segments, shares owned by CEO and 
option program deployment. Company specific data from Datastream: book value of assets, capital expenditures, 
current assets, current liabilities, book value of long-term debt, book value of debt, book value of equity, net 
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locating the source of value creation. The variable is expected to influence the dependent 
variable positively, except for the regression covering managerial risk aversion. 
 
The value of a firm is influenced by an extensive set of factors. In order examine if the use of 
currency derivatives is value enhancing, we need to control for other factors influencing firm 
value. The main framework used to establish which variables to include follows Allayannis 
and Weston (2001), although with modifications. We use the same control variables in the 
regressions examining the sources of value creation. 
Firm size: Several studies have concluded that large firms are more likely to hedge compared 
to smaller firms, because of the initial costs associated with a hedging program, see Mian 
(1996) and Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993). The positive correlation between firm value 
and hedging activity may be dependent on a positive correlation between firm value and size 
(research is ambiguous regarding this matter). To capture the potential effect of size we use 
the natural logarithm of total assets, see Equation 8. 
Size = ln(total assets) (8) 
Investment opportunities: Previous research has shown that firms actively hedging often 
experience greater investment opportunities (Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997). A firm with 
significant investment opportunities are perceived as attractive investments hence receives 
higher valuations. Allayannis and Weston (2001) use the ratio CAPEX over sales and R&D 
expenditures scaled by total sales, to measure investment opportunities. We bundle R&D and 
CAPEX and divided it with total sales (R&DCAPEX ratio), see Equation 9. Another approach 
to measure growth opportunities is to use market-to-book of assets. But this ratio is highly 
correlated with Q and distorts the regressions and therefore we discard this approach. 
Investment opportunities = 
R&𝐷 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 +𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋
Total  sales
 (9) 
Diversification effects: Lang and Stulz (1994) suggest that industrial diversification influences 
firm value negatively. To control for diversification effects we use a diversification dummy 
that equals 1 if the company is active in more than one segment (from annual reports). 
Furthermore we control for geographic diversification effects through foreign sales divided by 
total sales. Allayannis and Weston (2001) suggest that multinationality should be positively 
related to firm value. A company that is geographically dispersed may benefit from lower risk 
and greater potential for growth. Pramborg (2004) find that diversification is associated with a 
higher valuation in the Swedish market. 
                                                                                                                                                        
income, book value of inventory, interest payments, net income, sales, foreign sales and R&D expenditures. 
Furthermore we collect information about dividends, dividend yields, share prices and the market value of 
equity. All values are year-end values 
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Accessibility to financial markets: Capital constraints in terms of weak accessibility to 
external financing influence a firm‟s ability to undertake investments. A company with a 
stabile dividend yield is less expected to experience any capital constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen, 1998). Moreover, a firm with excess cash flows is also more probable to 
overinvest through undertaking negative net present value investments (Carter, Roger and 
Simkins, 2002). With this reasoning a user of currency derivatives that is experiencing capital 
constraints, may have greater incentives to only undertake positive net present value 
investments. Hence, have a higher Q due to capital constraints and not hedging activity. On 
the other hand, dividends also have signaling effects (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). A stable 
dividend yield may motivate a higher Q due to positive expectations on future performance. 
Firms with stable dividend yields are often regarded as more attractive investments and 
receive more favorable valuations, which would suggest a positive coefficient. A dividend 
dummy is used to capture the financing aspect which equals 1 if dividends have been paid out 
the current year and 0 otherwise. 
Leverage: According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, a firm‟s value is influenced 
by the debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio. Leveraging a company increases the firm value through the 
increasing value of tax-shields, but also increases the risk of financial distress and the present 
value of expected costs of financial distress (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). Haushalter 
(2000) provides evidence that the hedging activity increases with leverage, which corresponds 
to the theory of financial distress as a determinant for hedging. In order to control for the 
influence from capital structure on firm value, we use the book value of long-term debt over 
book of equity, see Equation 10. 
Leverage (D/E) = 
Book  value  of  debt
Book  value  of  equity
 (10) 
Profitability: Valuations is based on profitability measures, which suggests that profitable 
firms should be rewarded with higher valuations, hence a higher Q. To control the impact of 
profitability we use return on assets (ROA), measured as net income divided by book value of 
total assets, see Equation 11. 
Profitability (ROA) = 
Net  income
Total  assets
 (11) 
Industry effects: Our sample includes various industries which may have an impact on our 
results. If currency derivatives users belong to an industry with relatively higher Q´s, our 
results may be biased. Allayannis and Weston (2001) use an industry-adjusted Q to control for 
industry specific effects on the firm value. Our approach is somewhat different and instead of 
using an industry-adjusted Q, we control for industry effects with industry dummies. The 
rationale behind this approach is the non-linearity of the normal Q values. When constructing 
the industry-adjusted Qs, the majority of the companies in the sample end up with a negative 
value which rules out the use of natural logarithms. If the industry-adjusted Q would have 
been used, specification errors would have been apparent in the function, thus undermining 
the regression model‟s prerequisites and the explanatory power of the results. Through the use 
of dummies we account for the potential effect from industry belonging and dissimilarities 
between industries, such as influence from industry cycles, macroeconomic variables or 
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disruptive technologies. In the table below we describe the dummy variables used and the 
distribution in the categories for firms with a positive exposure (total of 351 observations). 
Table 3.1: Industry dummies and sample description 
 
 Industry Value No. Firms No. Obs. Hedgers Non-hedgers 
Energy 1 3 10 60% 40% 
Materials 2 8 27 100% 0% 
Machinery and engineering 3 41 151 86% 14% 
Merchandising 4 18 63 68% 32% 
Non-durables 5 5 18 77% 23% 
Health and personal care 6 9 30 87% 13% 
Real estate (financials) 7 13 10 80% 20% 
IT 8 8 30 63% 37% 
Telecom 9 3 12 75% 25% 
  
  
 
Time effects: The firm value, Tobin´s Q, is dependent on the current point in time and the 
fundamental expectations on the future. Therefore, the value of the firm naturally differs 
between years. When running separate regressions, there is no need for controlling time 
effects. However, we include year dummies when checking the robustness of our regressions 
(comparable with fixed period effects). 
Furthermore, Allayannis and Weston (2001) also use credit rating as a control variable. A 
company with a low credit rating may be traded at a premium and determine the firm value. 
Many Swedish companies do not have a credit rating. Because of this reason, we exclude this 
variable. 
 
The natural logarithm of Q constitutes our dependent variable in the regressions examining 
value creation, and the main explanatory variable is the FCD dummy that represents whether 
a firm deploys risk management through currency derivatives or not. Furthermore the 
exposure is defined as foreign sales scaled by total sales. The control variables functions as 
eliminators of other effects affecting the Q. The final regression model is defined below. 
Tobin´s Q =  α +  β ∙ FCDDUMMY +  β ∙ FOREIGNSALES/SALES +  β ∙ CONTOLVARIABLES+  ε 
Alfa represents the intercept, beta the coefficients and the sum of betas all the control 
variables. In the regression model we only include n-1 industry dummies, where n denotes the 
number of dummy variables. In the table shown below we summarize the expectations on the 
variables included in the regression model. 
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Table 3.2: Expectations on value creation 
 
Variable Value Expectations 
Exposure and diversification Foreign sales/sales Positive 
Hedging activity FCD dummy Positive 
Firm size LN(total assets) Positive/Negative 
Investment opportunities R&DCAP/sales Positive 
Diversification (industrial) Segment dummy Negative 
Accessibility to financing Dividend dummy Positive/Negative 
Leverage D/E book Positive/Negative 
Profitability ROA Positive 
Industry effects Industry dummies Positive/Negative 
Time effects Year dummies Positive/Negative 
 
  
 
Regarding the regression models examining the source of value creation our expectations is 
based on the theoretical framework presented in the literature review. We use the same 
control variables as in the regression model examining value creation, although we shift the 
dependent variable. 
Table 3.3: Expectations on the source of value creation 
 
 Regression Main variable Expectations 
Underinvestment FCD dummy Positive 
Financial distress FCD dummy Positive 
Debt capacity (tax shields) FCD dummy Positive 
Managerial risk aversion FCD dummy Positive/Negative 
 
  
 
Using ordinary (panel) least squares in a linear model require that a number of prerequisites 
are fulfilled. All regressions in this study have been controlled for autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity, normality and specification errors. The main regressions (yearly cross-
sectional) covering the value creation are free from problems regarding autocorrelation, which 
is supported by Durbin-Watson statistics. We use White´s heteroscedasticity test to determine 
if the samples has a constant variance. Heteroscedasticity is present in two of the separate 
samples (2006 and 2007) and accounted for by using White´s (1980) robust standard errors. 
Two additional prerequisites concerning the regression analysis is the normality assumption 
and multicollinearity. Regarding the normality assumption of the residuals, outliers are a 
central theme and the literature is ambiguous about the treatment of these. Brooks (2002) 
suggests that collecting additional data or converting variables into dummies may be a 
solution if outliers are present. Our sample includes all available observations in the Swedish 
market with sufficient information. Hence, our sample represents the population and further 
collection of data is not an option, while dummies reduce the informational substance from 
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important variables. However, Brooks (2008) argues that the violation of the normality 
assumption is negligible when the sample is sufficiently large; this corresponds well with our 
sample. Outliers have only been removed when influencing the regressions in a substantial 
manner (total of 5 observations). Moreover, we examine multicollinearity through correlation 
matrixes and none of the variables have a correlation exceeding 0.8. With regards to these 
tests, we conclude that the variables are not correlated, which indicates stable regression 
models. Lastly, we examine linearity in the parameters through Ramsey´s RESET test and 
none of the regressions indicates that non-linearity among the variables is present. Thus, 
suggesting that the function is correctly specified. 
In order to increase the robustness of our regressions covering value creation and to validate 
the separately performed regressions, we perform a pooled panel data regression (with year 
dummies) using panel least squares combined with White´s period/diagonal method. Through 
the combined approach we control the standard errors in regards to autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity, which is present in the combined sample (Eviews, User Guide 2). 
Moreover, we also carry out a panel least regression with fixed effects (period and cross-
sectional) to check the robustness of our regressions. A Hausman test reveals that a random 
effects model is not appropriate. 
The regression models concerning the source of value creation are performed using panel data 
and tested in the same manner as described above. All of the regressions show signs of 
heteroscedasticity and are corrected with White´s diagonal method. Moreover, the regressions 
covering underinvestment and managerial risk aversion are non-linear, which is corrected 
through the use of the natural logarithm. All models are tested with a „Redundant fixed effects 
test‟ and constructed accordingly with the results. The regression model concerning 
underinvestment is cross-section fixed, financial distress is cross-section and time fixed, debt 
capacity is cross-section fixed and managerial risk aversion through cross-section and time 
fixed effects. 
 
In this section we discuss the appropriateness of the study in terms of validity and reliability. 
Validity enlightens the relationship between the objectives of the study and how well the 
measurements in the study correspond with the objective, in other words, the correlation 
between theory and the operationalized approach (Bryman, 2002). Reliability refers to the 
repeatability of a study (Bryman, 2002). We briefly discuss these terms in order to evaluate 
the study from a critical point of view. 
 
The methodological framework used in this study, both regarding the dependent and 
independent variables has been used in several other studies. In regards to this, the method is 
considered to be applicable. Furthermore, Bryman (2003) stresses the importance of external 
validity in a study, whether the results may support generalization beyond the actual context 
33 
 
examined. Allayannis and Weston (2001) study the US market, which is characterized by an 
extensive domestic market and lower exposure towards exchange rates. Sweden is a small 
country heavily dependent on export. This distinction between different types of economies 
suggests that the results may only be applicable to comparable countries. Another important 
aspect is the corporate governance system and the differences in disclosure standards; the 
Swedish system is of Germanic character while the US system has Anglo-Saxon 
characteristics. The requirements on disclosure are more evident in the US stock markets than 
the Swedish. Thus, the availability of information may undermine the investor‟s possibility to 
determine the actual hedging activities, or alternatively influence the perception of the actual 
impact. This difference suggests that the results may not be useful in contexts with another 
type of corporate governance system. 
 
The reliability of this study concerns two dimensions, the data and methods used to analyze 
the data. The procedure of collecting data is thoroughly described and subject to no 
randomness. Furthermore the data is extracted from DataStream and annual reports, which are 
reliable sources. The decision to exclude firms is based strictly on theoretical assumptions or 
missing information. Consequently, we deem the reliability of the study as high due to the 
formal process adopted when framing the final sample. Moreover, the regressions have been 
conducted with Eviews, ensuring correct calculation methods. As already described, the data 
has been processed accordingly to econometric standards. The overall judgment suggests a 
high reliability. 
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In this chapter we present the results from our study, descriptive statistics of our sample and 
the regression models. First, the descriptive statistics is presented for the total sample, then 
the exposed firms and the unexposed firms. Secondly, comparison of means between hedgers 
and non-hedgers, with and without the effect from exchange rate movements taken into 
account. In the third part of this chapter the results from the regression models are presented, 
both yearly and for the total period.  
 
The total sample consists of 402 observations and 108 unique firms. To highlight the 
differences between firms, with and without exposure we present the statistics divided into 
three categories: all firms, firms with exposure through foreign sales and firms with no 
exposure, where firms with exposure is our main sample in the analysis. 
Table 4.1: All firms (n=402) 
 
 Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tobin`s Q 1.71 1.13 1.68 0.10 14.63 
Market value of equity 34 681 6371 90 248 168 640 031 
Total assets 28 902 6540 56 093 122 361 239 
Total sales 25 296 5008 48 325 9 303 667 
FCD dummy 0.70 1 0.45 0 1 
Foreign sales/sales 0.52 0.54 0.30 0.00 1.00 
CAPEX and R&D/sales 0.31 0.06 1.21 0.00 16.89 
Diversification dummy 0.44 0 0.49 0 1 
Dividend dummy 0.82 1 0.38 0 1 
D/E book 0.78 0.54 1.07 .00 13.94 
Return on assets 0.07 0.07 0.09 -0.73 0.34 
 
 
 
The total sample illustrates a wide dispersion in the variables, for an example Tobin´s Q 
varying from a minimum of 0.10 to maximum of 14.63. The mean Q is 1.71, which is lower 
compared to the previous study conducted on the Swedish market who recorded an average Q 
of 2.17 (Pramborg, 2004). Another interesting detail is that the mean value of the Q is higher 
than the median, indicating skewness in the variable (which is taken into account through 
using the natural logarithm in the regressions). Furthermore, there is a great dispersion in size, 
biased towards relatively smaller companies. The sample represents a great variety both in 
terms of size and type of company. It covers everything from multinational companies with 
vast product portfolios, to minor developing firm´s with a rather dry pipeline. In the method, 
we stressed the importance of size in terms of market value of equity in order to cope with the 
fixed costs associated with initiating a risk management program. As Table 4.1 shows, the 
minimum requirement of SEK400M ($50M) is not met. During the four-year period, seven 
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observations do not fulfill these requirements. Despite this fact, this violation is not 
considered to influence the possibility for initiating a risk management program when 
reviewing the firms separately. 
In our total sample, 70% of the companies use currency derivatives compared to 53% in 2003 
(Alkebäck, Hagelin and Pramborg, 2006). The increase is rather drastic given the short time 
period, but indicates that risk management has grown in importance.
5
 Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) observed smaller numbers on the American market, an average exposure of 18% and 
an average FCD dummy of 37%, which corresponds well with the expectations. The home 
market is larger, hence weaker incentives to expand internationally. Furthermore Table 4.1 
confirms Sweden´s reliance on exports through an average foreign sales ratio of 52%. 
Pramborg (2004) recorded a slightly lower average exposure of 40%.
6
 Defined in absolute 
measures, 87.3% of the firms in our sample are exposed through foreign sales. Regarding the 
control variables in the model, we will describe these in more detail for the companies that are 
exposed towards foreign currencies. 
Table 4.2: Firms with exposure (n=351) 
 
 Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tobin`s Q 1.76 1.26 1.71 0.10 14.63 
Market value of equity 38 978 7893 95 826 168 640 031 
Total assets 31 172 6326 59 568 122 361 239 
Total sales 28 771 6645 50 791 39 303 667 
FCD dummy 0.80 1 0.39 0 1 
Foreign sales/sales 0.60 0.59 0.24 0.10 1.00 
CAPEX and R&D/sales 0.10 0.05 0.22 0.00 2.84 
Diversification dummy 0.50 1 0.50 0 1 
Dividend dummy 0.80 1 0.39 0.00 1.00 
D/E book 0.70 0.48 1.06 0.00 13.94 
Return on assets 0.08 0.07 0.089 -0.73 0.33 
 
 
The average Tobin´s Q is higher for exposed firms compared to the total sample and the firms 
are larger in terms of market value of equity, total assets and total sales. Among the exposed 
firms, 80% of the sample uses FCDs to manage exposure. Moreover, the average export 
(foreign sales) exceeds more than half of the total sales, strengthening the arguments of why 
firms engage in risk management activities. The investment opportunities ratio is considerably 
lower in this sub-sample compared to the total sample in Table 4.1. The main reason is that 
many of the unexposed firms belong to industries where heavy investment activity is normal, 
such as biotech and real estate. Comparison regarding this ratio with prior studies is not 
                                                 
5
 We include a larger part of the predefined population (listed firms of sufficient size). This aspect may explain 
some of the differences in hedging activity. 
6
 Pramborg (2004) used total revenues and costs denominated in foreign currency to determine the foreign 
exposure/activity. This approach is more accurate, but at the other hand this type of information requires a 
survey study. Pramborg‟s figures are built upon three surveys with a total response rate of 51%, which may 
contribute with an explanation to some of the differences in the figures, as we record the entire population. 
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possible because we are using different methods of measurement. Pramborg (2004) used 
CAPEX/sales as an approximation and found an average of 11.7%, indicating a decline in 
investment activity since 1997-2001. One crucial aspect to consider in regards to this theme is 
that the IT boom took place during the years that study was conducted, which in part may 
explain the somewhat higher figures (this effect is also present in the Q values). 
The diversification mean is higher among the exposed firms, which is rather natural 
considering the excluded companies are mainly one-segment firms operating locally. The 
dividend average of 80% suggests that a large part of the firms pay dividends. Pramborg 
(2004) records that 70% of the firms investigated pay dividends; while Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) have an average of 86% on the American market. The differences between 
Swedish and American firms are expected due to the higher dependence on the stock markets 
(Anglo-American corporate governance system). The D/E ratio is lower for the exposed firms 
and the ROA is very similar. Further comparison of these measures is not possible due to lack 
of clarity of which variables other studies have used. 
The last category is the firms with no exposure. In this category we mainly find real estate 
firms and a few biotech firms. It is noticeable that this category actually includes one hedger. 
The firm did not reveal any exposure in terms of foreign sales, but most probably the hedges 
covers expenses denominated in foreign currency. The results are presented in Table 4.3, but 
we have no further intention in discussing this category and the analysis will only cover the 
firms with exposure, whereas a firm with no exposure has no self-preservation in hedging. 
Table 4.3: Firms without exposure (n=51) 
 
 Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tobin`s Q 1.31 0.92 1.43 0.20 7.56 
Market value of equity 5103 3103 4491 397 18 459 
Total assets 13 277 10 954 10 520 462 32 781 
Total assets 1384 1225 1689 9 11 258 
FCD dummy 0.01 0 0.14 0 1 
Foreign sales/sales 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CAPEX and R&D/sales 1.72 0.95 3.01 0.00 16.89 
Diversification dummy 0.01 0 0.14 0 1.00 
Dividend dummy 0.92 1 0.27 0 1.00 
D/E book 1.35 1.29 0.94 0.00 5.94 
Return on assets 0.03 0.06 0.12 -0.42 0.34 
 
 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) test their hypothesis of whether hedgers have higher Qs 
through comparison of mean values, without controlling for other factors influencing the Q. 
We present these statistics followed by a short discussion about the results. 
 
37 
 
If investors recognize the difference in risk between a hedged firm and non-hedged firm with 
foreign currency exposure, the hedger should receive a higher valuation based on the lower 
perceived risk in the investment, hence a higher mean Q. In order to test this assumption we 
examine the mean values for exposed firms and separate between hedgers and non-hedgers. 
Table 4.4: Comparison of Q means between hedgers and non-hedgers (n=351) 
 
Variable Hedgers (1) Non-hedgers (2) Difference (1) - (2) T-statistics 
Mean 1.72 1.93 -0.21 -0.923 
Std. Dev. 1.63 1.74   
No. Obs. 282 69   
 
The table shows that non-hedgers have higher average Q values than hedgers, even if the 
findings are not of statistic significance. This finding is consistent with Pramborg (2004), 
while Allayannis and Weston (2001) provides evidence that supports the hypothesis that 
hedgers have higher average valuations than non-hedgers. 
 
The impact of using currency derivatives is closely linked to exchange rate movements. In 
this study, the most common currency derivative is forwards. Taking a position in a forward 
contract obligates the parts to sell/buy. Therefore we would expect exchange rate movements 
to influence the potential premium from hedging. When the domestic currency appreciates, 
hedgers benefit from the use of currency derivatives given they are hedging, and not 
speculating. On the contrary, hedgers may hurt when the domestic currency depreciates, in 
other words, non-hedgers benefits. An important aspect to stress is that the losses induced by 
a depreciating currency, may partly be offset by the gain in competitive position. Allayannis 
and Weston (2001) find a statistically significant premium for hedgers during times of both 
appreciation and depreciation, although the premium is larger during times of appreciation. 
On the other hand, Pramborg (2004) finds no conclusive evidence of this hypothesis. In 
Figure 4.1 we present the total competitiveness weight (TCW) index during this period. The 
index is constructed through a basket of currencies weighted in relation to Swedish export and 
import (Riksbanken). The Swedish krona appreciated 2006-2007 and depreciated during 2005 
and 2008. 
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Figure 4.1: TCW-index 2005-2008 
  
Source: Riksbanken 
 
Accordingly to the graph we expect hedgers to benefit during 2006-2007 and experiencing 
disadvantages during 2005 and 2008 due to the deprecation. Worth noting is that 2008 is an 
exceptional year. In Table 4.5 we present the comparison divided into three periods, 2005, 
2006-2007 and 2008. 
Table 4.4: Comparison of Q means between hedgers and non-hedgers (n=351) 
 
 Time period Variable Hedgers (1) Non-hedgers (2) Difference (1) - (2) T-statistics 
2005 Mean 1.85 2.26 -0.41 -0.89 
Depreciation Std. Dev. 1.69 1.92   
 No Obs. 64 18   
2006-2007 Mean 1.99 2.17 -0.18 -0.64 
Appreciation Std. Dev. 1.88 1.70   
 No Obs. 213 56   
2008 Mean 0.89 0.93 -0.04 -0.18 
Depreciation Std. Dev. 0.74 0.59   
 No Obs. 69 13   
 
 
The comparison of means is in contrast to Allayannis and Weston (2001), inconclusive and 
provides no evidence that hedgers have a higher average value than non-hedgers. The findings 
strengthen Pramborg‟s (2004) results from the time period 1997-2001 where no evidence was 
found when comparing means. The yearly differences will be further elaborated in the 
regression analysis and be presented through a more multifaceted lens. 
 
Even if non-hedgers have higher mean Q values than hedgers, this measure is a rather weak 
determinant of value creation since other factors also affects Q. In this section we present the 
results from our yearly regressions and panel data regressions (pooled and fixed) with the 
dependent variable Q, in order to view hedging from a more sophisticated point of view. We 
also present the results from the regressions covering the sources of value creation. 
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In the multiple regressions we control for the factors considered to have an influence on firm 
value. The yearly regression, 2005-2008, is presented in Table 4.6 including the coefficients 
(top), standardized coefficients (middle) and t-statistics (bottom). The standardized 
coefficients enables comparison among the regressors and their relative influence on the 
dependent variable, Tobin‟s Q.7 Furthermore „***‟ denotes a significance of 0.01,‟**‟ denotes 
a significance of 0.05 and „*‟ 0.10. We also present the R-squared and adjusted R-squared 
obtained in the separate regressions. Overall, the separate regressions support the hypothesis 
that hedging foreign currency exposure has a positive impact on firm value. The premium is 
almost 40% in 2005, 31% in 2006, 13% in 2007 and -1% in 2008, and a total average of 21%. 
These figures will be further elaborated in the analysis. The adjusted R-squared is lower 
compared to Allayannis and Weston (2001), but in line with Pramborg (2004). 
Table 4.6: Yearly regressions with the dependent variable Q 
 
 Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean 
Constant 
1.39 
(2.30**) 
2.39 
(3.56) 
1.31 
(1.96*) 
-0.70 
(-1.36) 
1.09 
 
FCD dummy 
0.40 
0.23 
(2.23**) 
0.31 
0.18 
(1.60) 
0.14 
0.07 
(0.81) 
-0.01 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
0.21 
 
 
Foreign sales/sales 
0.61 
0.22 
(2.24**) 
0.40 
0.15 
(1.50) 
0.57 
0.19 
(2.61) 
0.47 
0.18 
(2.00**) 
0.51 
 
 
Assets (size) 
-0.14 
-0.37 
(-3.49***) 
-0.17 
-0.42 
(-3,59***) 
-0.12 
-0.30 
(-2.95***) 
-0.02 
-0.06 
(-0.66) 
-0.11 
 
 
R&DCAPEX/sales 
0.45 
0.10 
(0.63) 
0.63 
0.30 
(2.34**) 
0.97 
0.23 
(2.51**) 
1.14 
0.34 
(2.19**) 
0.80 
 
 
Diversification dummy 
-0.25 
-0.18 
(-1.64) 
-0.18 
-0.13 
(-1.48) 
-0.17 
-0.12 
(-1.26) 
-0.18 
-0.15 
(-1.50) 
0.20 
 
 
Dividend dummy 
0.09 
0.05 
(0.53) 
-0.01 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
0.06 
0.03 
(0.26) 
0.06 
0.03 
(0.26) 
0.05 
 
 
D/E book 
0.02 
0.02 
(0.16) 
0.01 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.03 
0.06 
(1.18) 
0.05 
0.08 
(0.92) 
0.03 
 
 
ROA 
3.40 
0.32 
(2.75***) 
2.56 
0.43 
(3.03***) 
4.03 
0.39 
(3.33***) 
4.30 
0.62 
(6.20***) 
3.57 
 
 
      
No. obs. 82 92 95 82 351 
R-squared 0.53 0.48 0.48 0.62 0.53 
Adj. R-squared 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.52 0.42 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Standardized coefficients are expressed as changes in standard deviation units (Damodar, 2004). This enables 
comparison between the explanatory variables coefficients and enables us to determine the economic influence. 
A short example to simplify the interpretation follows. If the explanatory variable has a coefficient of 0.3β, an 
increase of one standard deviation in this variable causes an increase of 0.3 standard deviations in the dependent 
variable. 
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As mentioned before, the significance levels are important when trying to make inferences 
about a population from a small sample. However, we have included all firms available in the 
population, which is relaxing the requirements of statistical significance in order to draw 
conclusions about the population. The complete regressions (including industry dummies) are 
presented in Appendix 4. 
In Table 4.7 we present a pooled and a fixed effects regression. The pooled regression is 
performed using panel least squares controlling the autocorrelation. We reach the same 
significance levels when controlling the heteroscedasticity. The FCD dummy for the period, 
2005-2008, sums up to 17% with the pooled regression when controlling for both industry 
effects and time effects. Allayannis and Weston (2001) found a premium of 5% using the 
same regression model and Pramborg (2004) found a positive premium of 14% on the 
Swedish market. When taking into account the unique characteristics (e.g. managerial quality) 
and time effects in the fixed effects regression, we find a positive premium of 4%. The results 
are similar to Allayannis and Weston (2001) in the matter that the premium using fixed effects 
is lower compared to the pooled regression model approach, even if we experience a greater 
dispersion between the values. The complete pooled regression, with industry and year 
dummies included, is presented in Appendix 5. 
Table 4.7: Pooled and fixed effects regressions with the dependent variable Q 
 
 Variable Pooled  Fixed effects 
Constant 
1.32 
(2.86***) 
6.95 
(3.74***) 
FCD dummy 
0.17 
0.09 
(1.16) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
 
Foreign sales/sales 
0.49 
0.16 
(2.59**) 
0.08 
(0.30) 
 
Assets (size) 
-0.12 
-0.27 
(-3.58***) 
-0.45 
(-3.92***) 
 
R&DCAPEX/sales 
0.96 
0.28 
(5.01***) 
0.48 
(1.83*) 
 
Diversification dummy 
-0.18 
-0.11 
(-1.91*) 
0.00 
(-0.11) 
 
Dividend dummy 
0.05 
0.03 
(0.37) 
0.10 
(0.85) 
 
D/E book 
0.04 
0.06 
(2.07**) 
0.04 
(2.30**) 
 
ROA 
3.43 
0.40 
(6.03***) 
2.19 
(3.74***) 
 
   
No. obs. 351 351 
R-squared 0.57 0.91 
Adj. R-squared 0.54 0.87 
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In order to determine the source of value creation, we conduct four independent fixed effects 
regressions (the effects fixed varies between the models, see 3.5). As mentioned before, we 
examine underinvestment through the natural logarithm of R&DCAPEX/sales, financial 
distress as NI/TA, debt capacity through D/E and managerial risk aversion as CEO ownership 
divided by market cap. Table 8 shows that the FCD dummy is significant in the three first 
regressions, while it is insignificant when examining managerial risk aversion. In the last 
regression, covering managerial risk aversion, we experience a small loss of observations. 
This is however not considered problematical when investigating the observations. 
Table 4.8: Fixed effects regressions on sources to value creation 
 
Variable Underinvestment Financial distress Debt capacity Managerial 
Constant 
-4.58 
(-2.78***) 
0,56 
(2.12**) 
-3.89 
(-2.49**) 
-14.42 
(-2.71***) 
FCD dummy 
0.27 
(3.11***) 
0,05 
(2.80***) 
-0.22 
(-2.56**) 
-1.58 
(-1.42) 
Foreign sales/sales 
-0.16 
(-0.62) 
0.12 
(2.52**) 
0.07 
(0.28) 
1.10 
(1.31) 
Assets (size) 
0.10 
(0.92) 
-0.04 
(-2.04**) 
0.30 
(3.01***) 
0.44 
(1.32) 
R&DCAPEX/sales 
- 
- 
-0.27 
(-4.14***) 
-0.03 
(-0.11) 
1.05 
(2.74***) 
Diversification dummy 
-0.05 
(-1.11) 
0.002 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(1.01) 
0.47 
(1.14) 
Dividend dummy 
0.04 
(0.24) 
0.002 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
D/E book 
0.01 
(0.70) 
-0.005 
(-1.42) 
- 
- 
0.09 
(1.95*) 
ROA 
-1.12 
(-2.46**) 
- 
- 
-1.09 
(-1.93*) 
1.41 
(1.32) 
     
No. obs. 351 351 351 334 
R-squared 0.94 0.81 0.67 0.91 
Adj. R-squared 0.91 0.72 0.53 0.87 
 
The FCD dummy is significant in all of the regressions except for managerial risk aversion. 
The interpretation of the FCD dummy is that use of currency derivatives is positively related 
to growth opportunities, companies that hedge has a lower bankruptcy risk and are not as 
leveraged as non-hedgers. Furthermore, hedgers are more likely to have a CEO with less 
stock compared to a non-hedging company. These findings will be further elaborated in the 
analysis. 
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In this chapter we conduct our analysis covering the empirical results presented in chapter 4. 
First, we discuss the results from the regressions covering value creation. Secondly, we 
analyze the sources of value creation.  
 
First, when comparing average Q values for hedgers and non-hedgers we find a value 
discount for hedging and no evidence that the premium varies with exchange rate movements. 
Previous research uses this approach for drawing conclusions about sub-samples and 
differences over time. However, we would like to stress that comparing average Q values only 
provide an indication of the possible relationship between hedging and firm value. We believe 
that hedging will not affect the average Q and that it is required to remove other factors 
potentially affecting the value of a firm. When isolating the hedging effect we find an average 
premium of 21%, although only significant in 2005. As mentioned before, the sample used in 
this study is as close to the entire population as possible, making statistic significance less 
important. Since the hedging premium has a rather large economic influence (standardized 
coefficients) on Q compared to other variables, we consider the value effect from hedging as 
an important source of value. 
 
The premium found, awarding hedging companies with an average value premium of 21%, 
instinctively seem rather large and perhaps even doubtful. It is however imperative to stress 
that the use of foreign currency derivatives serves as a proxy for risk management and should 
therefore not be regarded as the premium for the use of currency derivatives alone. For an 
example, 55.3% of the hedgers in the sample also hedges interest rate risk, which may 
influence the size of the premium. In order to properly motivate the premium, it is important 
to put the findings into perspective with prior studies. Allayannis and Weston (2001) found a 
premium of 4.8% for the US market whereas Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007) found a 
premium of 9-20% for firms in 39 non-US countries around the world. The explanation for 
the deviation in the premium is higher volatility in exchange rates, which increases the 
exchange rate risk. This is certainly the case for Sweden, being a net exporting country with a 
rather small currency. Furthermore, Pramborg (2004) show a positive hedging premium of 
13.8% for the Swedish market. We conclude that the size of the value premium found is 
implausibly high from a theoretical and logical standpoint, it is however comparable in size 
range of previous research. 
 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) found that the hedging premium increase in size during years 
of domestic currency appreciation. The separate yearly hedging premiums show a positive 
sign in 2005, 2006 and 2007, whereas it is slightly negative in 2008. Following Allayannis 
and Weston‟s (2001) reasoning, it is unexpected that our results show the largest hedging 
premium in 2005, a year in which the Swedish krona depreciated. This is however in line with 
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Pramborg (2004), who found positive hedging premiums being awarded on the Swedish 
market despite domestic currency depreciation. Although, the premiums between 2005 and 
2007 are in line with theory, investor‟s values the decreased volatility over time higher than 
short-term currency gains, or losses. 
In 2008, the hedging premium decreases substantially and even ends up being negative. 
Considering the findings of 2005-2007, we do not attribute this decrease to the depreciating 
krona alone, rather to the extraordinary macroeconomic events of that year. The global 
financial crisis struck with a rapid pace, tightening the supply of funds. The ability to generate 
internal funds and preserving liquidity therefore became more important, perhaps even to such 
an extent that it can be considered a competitive advantage. As a consequence, the focus of 
firms and investors changed from a long-term perspective to short-term survival. This 
argument is further strengthened by the fact that ROA increases significantly in importance as 
a determinant of Q during 2008. Showing that internal generation of funds is more highly 
valued during this period when the threat of financial distress is more substantial and sources 
of funds are scarce. A depreciating domestic currency presents advantages to firms with 
foreign sales, in terms of increasing relative competitiveness and revenues, an advantage 
which hedging firms forego. We conclude that a depreciating domestic currency alone is not 
regarded by investors as a detrimental factor on firm value, but in combination with 
macroeconomic events causing widespread financial distress and short termism hedging 
discounts firm value. 
 
The foreign sales ratio is significant three out of four years and has a high economic 
importance. The variable is used, both to determine exposure and measure the geographical 
diversification effects. Pramborg (2004) suggests that the influence of this variable can be 
attributed to the diversification. Our regression is almost identical to Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) and they find a lower impact from geographical diversification. We think this variable 
is very important from an investor point of view. A company without foreign exposure is 
automatically limited to the Swedish market and may be perceived as a less favorable 
investment due the natural restrictions provided by the contextual barriers. Moreover, this 
variable is also closely interconnected to risk management. Being geographically diversified 
is rewarded with a higher value, but being diversified and unhedged would result in a lower 
premium compared with a hedging diversified company. 
Theory is ambiguous on the matter if company size influences value. Our results are 
significant three out of four years and suggest that size influences Q negatively. The 
standardized coefficient suggests that this variable is the main variable influencing Q 
negatively. Our interpretation of these results is that flexibility is valued rather than scale of 
economies. Another explanation is that smaller firms may have greater growth opportunities; 
since there is a natural barrier to how fast a mature company may grow. Our findings are 
consistent with both Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Pramborg (2004). 
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The R&DCAPEX ratio is the second most influential variable according to the standardized 
coefficients and shows statistic significance three out of four years. The market-to-book of 
assets is most likely a better approximation of investment opportunities, but not feasible in our 
study. Furthermore, we find a negative influence from industrial diversification, which 
indicates that firms active in many industrial segments receive lower firm values. Firms 
focusing on one segment are rewarded. Although, we would like to stress that this measure do 
not fully capture the dilemma of diversification. Our measure is based on segments and not 
pure industrial diversification and it would be interesting to investigate whether or not our 
results are accurate through further investigation. 
With regards to the access to financial markets, the dividend dummy supports the Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) arguments of a positive signaling effect. We do not find any support for the 
ideas about capital constraints benefiting owners through investments in positive NPV 
investments. The D/E ratio has a positive influence on Q, which supports Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) about optimal leverage and the utilization of tax-shields. Another 
explanation might be mitigation of agency costs due to the increased monitoring that is related 
to debt. Moreover, ROA is the most influential variable. Considering that many valuation 
techniques include some form of accounting based measure such as earnings, this finding is 
consistent with the expectations. 
 
As a robustness check we conduct both a pooled and a fixed effects regression. In the pooled 
regression we find a significant hedging premium of 17%. However, the FCD dummy has less 
economical influence on Q compared to the yearly regressions. The signs in the regressions 
are the same, which adds reliability to our conclusions (size and industrial diversification is 
negative). We also find significance in many of the industry dummies, suggesting that 
industry belonging matters. The fixed effects regression also strengthens our results, but 
shows more reasonable figures. The hedging premium is 4% when taking into account both 
cross-sectional and yearly differences through dummy variables. Although, we consider 
pooling industries a more convenient approach compared too introducing dummies for every 
company. The reason is that many time-series is rather short and the yearly differences are 
large, which influence the results and bias the premium. Therefore, we lean towards a higher 
premium than 4%. The conclusion is that a premium is certainly found but its size is 
questionable. 
 
The analysis above provides evidence that hedging exchange rate exposure is value creating 
when measuring value creation through the approximation of Q. The main source of value 
creation is according to theory derived from the reduced volatility in cash flows. If thinking in 
terms of the formula of the Q value, there are four factors influencing the numerator: the 
market value of equity, long-term debt, current liabilities and current assets. In other words, 
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the value of Q could be enhanced by risk management in four different ways when 
considering the variables included. First, hedging provides a company with a more stable cash 
flow, which in return should yield a higher average market valuation when using cash flow 
based valuation models. Second, hedging should according to theory enable an increase in 
long-term debt through increased debt capacity. An increase in debt also increases the 
denominator (same effect when current liabilities and current assets change), but in return the 
tax-shields are increasing which affects the cash flow in a positive manner, hence a higher 
market value of equity. Third, hedging reduces according to theory costs of financial distress 
and may affect the current liabilities. More stable cash flows increase the predictability and 
reliability, which should increase bargaining power towards suppliers and improve trade 
credits. In other words, provide the company with a cheap source of financing and lowering 
the cost of capital if efficiently used. Hence, a higher market value of equity. Fourth, hedging 
provides a firm with a more stable cash flow which lowers the requirements on maintaining a 
high liquidity level in order to retain financial flexibility. Lower cash reserves decreases the 
current assets and reduces the working capital. An increase in operating performance is 
valuable from an investor‟s point of view which should affect the market value of equity 
positively. 
The reasoning above strengthens one important aspect; the most influential variable in Q is 
the market value of equity. But the question remain, what is the source of value and what 
factors are influencing investors to trade non-hedged firms on a discount and paying a 
premium for hedging firms? 
 
The first theoretical foundation relates to the underinvestment problem. We have measured 
the potential effect from currency hedging on investment opportunities through the 
R&DCAPEX ratio as the dependent variable. The FCD dummy reveals a positive significant 
relationship between investment activity and the use of currency derivatives. Our findings 
indicate that an exposed firm that hedges is investing more in both tangible and intangible 
assets. The evidence supports the findings of Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), who found 
that investment opportunities are a determinant of hedging. We strengthen Hagelin´s (2003) 
findings that Swedish firm‟s hedge to mitigate underinvestment problems. 
The FCD dummy strengthens the hypothesis that currency derivatives mitigate the 
underinvestment problem through the positive influence on the size of investments in relation 
to sales. In order to determine if this can motivate a premium, we turn to the regressions and 
the economical influence of the R&DCAPEX ratio (standardized coefficients). The control 
variable for investment opportunities is the second most influential variable with regards to Q. 
When combining the results from both value creation and underinvestment, we conclude that 
investment opportunities may be regarded as an important source of value creation, given the 
influence on Q. To conclude the reasoning, we find evidence that a firm with a risk 
management program have greater investment opportunities, thus indicating that currency 
hedging mitigates the underinvestment problem. 
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Theory predicts that the expected costs of financial distress can be mitigated by risk 
management through minimizing the volatility of cash flows and thereby decreasing the 
probability for ending up in a state of default. We measure the risk of bankruptcy through 
NI/TA, based on Shumway´s (2001) research. As presented in the literature review, the 
evidence regarding financial distress as a determinant to hedging is ambiguous. Our findings 
indicate that the use of currency derivatives is positively related to a reduction in the 
probability of financial distress, as the NI/TA increases with hedging. Our findings add to 
Hagelin (2003) who found evidence for indirect costs of financial distress as a determinant of 
hedging, whereas we find proof that hedgers decreases the probability of financial distress. 
The lower probability for hedgers ending up in state where necessary investments can‟t be 
carried out has clear connection to the underinvestment problem, which strengthens the 
conclusion about mitigating underinvestment as an important source of value. 
A troubling aspect surrounding the NI/TA ratio is that it is hard to separate between value 
effects from the decreased risk of financial distress and the impact from NI/TA as a 
profitability measure. The ratio NI/TA has a great influence on a Q and it is impossible to 
separate the specific value effects. However, the expected costs of financial distress can be 
defined through two components, the probability of default and the present value of financial 
distress costs. According to our analysis the hedging firm decreases the probability of default, 
while the costs remain the same. The implications of the lower probability should affect the 
market value of equity in a positive direction and result in a value creating effect, caused by 
currency hedging. 
 
According to the trade-off theory the capital structure of a company is an important 
determinant of market value. A firm has to carefully consider the D/E ratio in order to 
efficiently benefit from the increased value provided by increased tax-shields, without 
increasing the present value of expected costs of financial distress. A firm hedging currency 
risk and mitigating the fluctuations in cash flows should be able to carry more debt without 
increasing the risk at the same rate. We used the D/E ratio as the dependent variable in order 
to analyze how hedging influences the choice of capital structure. The FCD dummy suggests 
a negative relationship between hedging and the use of debt. This serves as an indicator that 
hedging companies may be underleveraged compared to non-hedgers. Risk management 
decreases the volatility in cash flows and according to our analysis reduces the probability of 
financial distress, which in theory motivates a firm to increase leverage. Thus, the conclusion 
about using hedging to increase debt capacity and benefit from the positive value effect from 
tax-shields does not seem to be related to the firms in our sample. Instead our analysis 
suggests that the firms are underleveraged compared to non-hedgers. On the contrary, the 
value effect from an increase in debt to equity seems modest when considering the 
standardized coefficients in the regression models regarding Q in Table 4.6 or Table 4.7. The 
D/E ratio is one of the variables with the smallest economical influence on Q, indicating that 
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an increase in D/E may not influence firm value in a substantial matter. For example, Graham 
and Rogers (2002) found that the increase in debt capacity increases firm value with 1%, 
which is a rather modest figure compared to the suggested hedging premium. 
 
As described in the literature review, managerial risk aversion is dependent on how a manager 
is compensated. We test explicitly for risk aversion through examining the natural logarithm 
of CEO ownership divided by the total market value of equity as the dependent variable. We 
find that hedging and CEO ownership is negatively related. According to these results the 
CEO in a hedging firm owns a smaller fraction of the company compared with non-hedging 
firms. These results do not support the theoretical framework that suggests that CEO 
ownership should be positively related to hedging activities. One potential explanation is that 
Sweden has a rather developed corporate governance system in place, enforcing managers to 
work in the best interest of the shareholders. Another important aspect that makes this 
measure difficult to investigate is the presence of option programs. In our sample 72% of the 
hedgers have an option program in place, which may affect the choice to hedge differently 
dependent on if the options are in-the-money or out-of-the-money. We do not intend to 
investigate this aspect further; instead we refer to Hagelin et al. (2007) regarding this matter. 
Nevertheless, the measure we have chosen may not be representative. The most convenient 
ratio would be the amount of private wealth tied up in the company compared to total wealth, 
which would reveal how exposed the manager actually is. To conclude, our evidence is not 
surprising with regards to the empirical studies done on managerial risk aversion, since they 
present a rather inconclusive picture of the problem. 
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In this chapter we present our conclusions regarding the findings in our study, covering value 
creation and the sources thereof.  
 
This study has two main purposes. First, investigate if hedging foreign exchange rate risks is 
value creating for Swedish firms and if yearly differences exist. Second, examine the potential 
sources supporting the value creation. 
Our findings show that Swedish firms hedging their foreign currency exposure are assigned a 
premium of 4-21%. Hedging exchange rate risk is more valuable in a small economy like 
Sweden that is dependent on exports, has a more volatile currency and therefore a large 
macroeconomic exposure. We show that the value effect of hedging can differ between years 
and that depreciation in the domestic currency not necessarily diminishes the premium of 
hedging. However, we find that when deprecation in the domestic currency is combined with 
macroeconomic events causing widespread financial distress and short-termism, the value of 
hedging firms is discounted. The overall evidence supports theory on risk management as a 
value creating activity, independent of short-term fluctuations in exchange rates. Investors 
seem to value the long-term benefits from risk management activities. 
We examine the following four potential sources of value creation: mitigation of the 
underinvestment problem, reduction in expected financial distress costs, increased debt 
capacity and managerial risk aversion. The source that is the most significant is the use of 
hedging to relieve underinvestment problems. Our findings show that hedging firms have 
more investment opportunities compared to non-hedgers, which is an important source of 
value creation. Furthermore, we find a positive relation between hedging and a reduction in 
the probability of financial distress, indicating that Swedish firm‟s hedge currency risk in 
order to increase their value by lowering the probability of incurring costs associated with 
financial distress situations. Our evidence with regards to how hedging influence the capital 
structure decision indicates a negative relation between hedging and leverage. This may 
suggest that hedging firms in Sweden have an averse attitude towards risk overall. We 
therefore suggest that Swedish exchange rate hedgers are not making use of the additional 
debt capacity created through hedging and is therefore foregoing value increasing tax-shields. 
The final source of value creation is managerial risk aversion, where we do not find a positive 
relation between CEO share ownership and hedging.  
We conclude that Swedish firms are hedging for the right reasons and therefore manage to 
enhance firm value, but are not utilizing the interest tax-shield fully. 
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We provide evidence that risk management activities are value enhancing in the long-term, 
which supports the theories on risk management. On the other hand, we find distinctive yearly 
deviations of the premium within the time period. Previous studies use rather simplistic 
methods to determine the yearly impact from risk management, which might be misguiding 
due to possible inherent differences over time. In order to increase the understanding of when 
risk management is valuable, we propose that further research should elaborate on potential 
differences over time. In other words, pinpoint time bound differences in value creation and 
determining underlying causes through even more refined methodological approaches. An 
approach of this manner would benefit the actual predictability of the theories and provide 
guidance in practical situations. 
Furthermore, Swedish firms that are hedging through currency derivatives seem to be 
underleveraged. According to theory a hedging firm should be able to increase leverage 
through decreased volatility without increasing the risk of financial distress. An interesting 
question is why hedging firms are underleveraged? There may be different possible 
explanations, such as risk aversion, financial flexibility, increased dependence on equity 
markets, hybrid financing, ownership structure etc. We therefore encourage further research 
on the topic to bring clarity to the underlying causes, both in regards to risk management and 
capital structure in general. 
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 Variables (TOBQ) 2005 (82) 2006 (92) 2007 (95) 2008 (82) Mean (351) 
Constant 
1.39 
(2.30**) 
2.39 
(3.56***) 
1.31 
(1.96*) 
-0.70 
(-1.36) 
1.09 
 
FCD dummy 
0.40 
0.23 
(2.23**) 
0.31 
0.18 
(1.60) 
0.14 
0.07 
(0.81) 
-0.01 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
0.21 
 
 
Foreign sales/sales 
0.61 
0.22 
(2.24**) 
0.40 
0.15 
(1.50) 
0.57 
0.19 
(2.61) 
0.47 
0.18 
(2.00**) 
0.51 
 
 
Assets (size) 
-0.14 
-0.37 
(-3.49***) 
-0.17 
-0.42 
(-3.59***) 
-0.12 
-0.30 
(-2.95***) 
-0.02 
-0.06 
(-0.66) 
-0.11 
 
 
RDCAPEX/sales 
0.45 
0.10 
(0.63) 
0.63 
0.30 
(2.34**) 
0.97 
0.23 
(2.51**) 
1.14 
0.34 
(2.19**) 
0.80 
 
 
Diversification dummy 
-0.25 
-0.18 
(-1.64) 
-0.18 
-0.13 
(-1.48) 
-0.17 
-0.12 
(-1.26) 
-0.18 
-0.15 
(-1.50) 
0.20 
 
 
Dividend dummy 
0.09 
0.05 
(0.53) 
-0.01 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
0.06 
0.03 
(0.26) 
0.06 
0.03 
(0.26) 
0.05 
 
 
D/E book 
0.02 
0.02 
(0.16) 
0.01 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.03 
0.06 
(1.18) 
0.05 
0.08 
(0.92) 
0.03 
 
 
ROA 
3.40 
0.32 
(2.75***) 
2.56 
0.43 
(3.03***) 
4.03 
0.39 
(3.33***) 
4.30 
0.62 
(6.20***) 
3.57 
 
 
Industry dummy 1 
0.55 
0.12 
(0.70) 
-0.26 
-0.07 
(-0.73) 
-0.73 
-0.18 
(-2.29**) 
-0.94 
-0.23 
(-1.78*) 
-0.35 
 
 
Industry dummy 2 
0.54 
0.21 
(2.23**) 
0.33 
0.13 
(0.98) 
0.23 
0.09 
(0.58) 
0.16 
0.06 
(0.76) 
0.32 
 
 
Industry dummy 4 
0.49 
0.27 
(2.58**) 
0.32 
0.18 
(1.77*) 
0.26 
0.14 
(1.44) 
0.22 
0.13 
(1.46) 
0.32 
 
 
Industry dummy 5 
0.07 
0.03 
(0.29) 
0.23 
0.08 
(1.61) 
0.19 
0.06 
(0.78) 
0.53 
0.16 
(1.87*) 
0.26 
 
 
Industry dummy 6 
0.60 
0.22 
(2.40**) 
0.50 
0.20 
(3.30***) 
0.31 
0.12 
(1.91*) 
0.40 
0.19 
(1.89*) 
0.45 
 
 
Industry dummy 7 
-0.59 
-0.13 
(-1.39) 
-0.80 
-0.17 
(-5.92***) 
-0.94 
-0.23 
(-4.63***) 
-0.20 
-0.06 
(-0.71) 
-0.63 
 
 
Industry dummy 8 
0.49 
0.19 
(1.96*) 
0.38 
0.15 
(1.18) 
0.23 
0.09 
(0.97) 
0.14 
0.06 
(0.68) 
0.31 
 
 
Industry dummy 9 
0.97 
0.26 
(2.91***) 
0.35 
0.09 
(2.03**) 
0.57 
0.14 
(3.29***) 
0.29 
0.09 
(1.08) 
0.55 
 
 
      
R-squared 0.53 0.48 0.48 0.62 0.53 
Adj. R-squared 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.52 0.42 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
 
 Variables Pooled Fixed effects 
Constant 
1.32 
(2.86***) 
6.95 
(3.74***) 
FCD dummy 
0.17 
0.09 
(1.16) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
 
Foreign sales/sales 
0.49 
0.16 
(2.59**) 
0.08 
(0.30) 
 
Assets (size) 
-0.12 
-0.27 
(-3.58***) 
-0.45 
(-3.92***) 
 
R&DCAPEX/sales 
0.96 
0.28 
(5.01***) 
0.48 
(1.83*) 
 
Diversification dummy 
-0.18 
-0.11 
(-1.91*) 
0.00 
(-0.11) 
 
Dividend dummy 
0.05 
0.03 
(0.37) 
0.10 
(0.85) 
 
D/E book 
0.04 
0.06 
(2.07**) 
0.04 
(2.30**) 
 
ROA 
3.43 
0.40 
(6.03***) 
2.19 
(3.74***) 
 
Industry dummy 1 
-0.52 
-0.11 
(-1.94*) 
- 
Industry dummy 2 
0.30 
0.10 
(1.01) 
- 
Industry dummy 4 
0.32 
0.16 
(2.21**) 
- 
Industry dummy 5 
0.20 
0.06 
(1.52) 
- 
Industry dummy 6 
0.43 
0.16 
(4.24***) 
- 
Industry dummy 7 
-0.63 
-0.14 
(-6.98***) 
- 
Industry dummy 8 
0.31 
0.11 
(1.51) 
- 
Industry dummy 9 
0.53 
0.13 
(3.51***) 
- 
2006 dummy 
0.17 
0.10 
(3.62***) 
- 
2007 dummy 
-0.08 
-0.05 
(-1.73*) 
- 
2008 dummy 
-0.62 
-0.34 
(-10.4***) 
- 
   
No. obs. 351 351 
R-squared 0.57 0.91 
Adj. R-squared 0.54 0.87 
 
